

1968/9

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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH

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FILE No. **NEQ** 1/1 (115 & (Part C.)

TITLE: *Iraq. Reports on the Internal Situation.*

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PART

1/1

NEQ

FILE No.

- 1 SEP 1969

Cutting dated 19

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 9 SEP 1969

Espionage Is Major Activity in Mideast

NEQ 1/1

By Dana Adams Schmidt

BEURUT (NYT).—The execution of 15 Iraqi "spies," two of them Jews and two Christians, and the prospect of further Iraqi trials and executions, has turned attention to a by-product of the Arab-Israeli conflict—espionage.

The Israelis frequently boast about the excellence of their intelligence in the Arab world, and the accuracy of some of their bombing during the June, 1967, war suggests that the boasts are not idle. The Israelis have excelled presumably because of their understanding of the Arab mentality and the wide-ranging personal contacts that Jewish refugees had made with the Arab world. Contacts established before 1948, when Israeli Jews could travel in the Arab world, have also doubtless played a role.

Another factor is the nature of Arab society. The concept of the state as an organism to which they owe loyalty is relatively new to most Arabs. They had lived for centuries under a widely despised Turkish rule. Their loyalties were to family, to tribe, to religion and not to any state.

With the exception of Egypt, the states carved out of the Ottoman Empire after World War I were new concepts, at best former administrative subdivisions of the Turkish Empire. In this context the representatives of foreign states found that paid informers were easily found.

States Build Loyalty

But little by little the young Arab states built up both loyalties and specific defenses, especially after 1948. The counterespionage agent became ubiquitous, an annoyance to the public, a danger to the health of the state, but apparently essential to its security.

In 1955 Egyptian counterintelligence detected a group of young Egyptian Jews whom Israeli intelligence had employed

to plant an incendiary bomb in the U.S. Information Center in Alexandria with the intention of undermining U.S.-Egyptian relations. The famous Lavon affair, which pitted David Ben-Gurion against Pinhas Lavon on the Israeli political scene, ensued.

One of the members of that early group of young Egyptian Jews who escaped was Elie Cohen. Israeli intelligence carefully prepared him for an espionage role by sending him to Argentina where he posed as a Syrian immigrant. Playing the role of a "returning" Syrian, he then established himself in Damascus, an eminently successful businessman, it seemed, with ample means, who penetrated the highest circles of Syrian society. Since his apprehension and conviction in 1965 he has been celebrated in Israel as a hero.

Woman Convicted

Before that, Lebanon had the Shula Cohen affair—a Jewish woman who was convicted for running a spy ring and is now in prison.

The problems of Iraq were probably complicated by the fact that until 1958 it remained a pro-Western state in which Israel and the Western powers found it easier than elsewhere to establish contacts. The current spy campaign dates back to the defection of Munir Rofa, an Iraqi pilot who in August, 1966, flew his MiG-21 to Israel. This event came as an immense shock to Iraq. Much information was turned up in the ensuing anti-spy drive, but little action was taken before the regime was overthrown.

Taking power on July 17, 1968, the Ba'athist regime accused its predecessors of sheltering spies. The new president said: "There shall be no place for spies and imperialist agents on Iraqi soil."

At the end of December, a revolutionary court was formed and early in January the first group of "spies" was tried. On

Jan. 27 14 were hanged, including nine Jews. Other trials followed and 51 persons have now been put to death, 11 of them Jews. All those executed were accused of spying for Israel, Iran and the American Central Intelligence Agency.

More to Come

The fact that the highest ranking of those executed thus far was a first lieutenant suggests that a good deal more is to come. Eighty-five high-ranking persons are under arrest, including former Premier Abdul Rahman Bazzaz and several former ministers and generals.

From the first, however, the specific task of combating espionage in Iraq became intertwined with Ba'ath party politics. Those convicted were made to say things that would discredit the former regime and any potential opposition.

As the Ba'athist attempt to broaden the party base and establish alliances with other political elements broke down, the net of those to be implicated was extended to moderates Nasserites, Communists, old regime feudalists, everybody. And with the increasing fear of a counter-coup, the Ba'athists began to implicate leading army officers such as Maj. Gen. Abdel Aziz al-Auqueili. There have been shocking stories told of what was done to humiliate and break these men.

General Terror

As the Ba'athists steeled themselves to cling to power, they were beguiled by the value of these political-espionage proceedings as a means of inspiring general terror. At the same time they sought popularity by exploiting the basest instincts of the public—anti-Jewish feeling and suspicion of foreigners. What they perhaps omitted from their calculations was that such a policy would damage their cause in the eyes of the world.

Iraqi Intel
AM

X

THE TIMES

4 SEP 1969

Cutting dated 19

THE TIMES DIARY

Bazzaz trial begins •

THE IRAQI Baathist regime has begun a secret trial of the former Prime Minister Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz, who has been held in prison for many months. According to tomorrow's Jewish Observer & Middle East Review the trial began at the end of last week in Baghdad.

Bazzaz is being charged, with former Chief-of-Staff Ibrahim Feisal al-Ansari and about 20 other people, with conspiring to overthrow the Government. Another leading Iraqi now in detention, former Defence Minister, General Abdel Aziz al-Okeili, is not involved in this trial.

The present charges against Bazzaz replace four previous published charges in which Bazzaz was accused of collaborating with "Zionism and imperialism".

The trial is not being televised, as was at first expected, for a number of reasons, including Bazzaz's relationship with Nasser and because he bears the marks of ill treatment in prison. On February 20 I reported that Bazzaz was believed to have lost an eye through torture.



116

Reg. 10

PANAM

1/9

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 10 SEP 1969
NEQ 1/1

BBC B

URGENT

B7 THREE EXECUTED IN BAGHDAD

NE (BAGHDAD RADIO 0415 GMT 8 SEP) DEATH SENTENCES AGAINST THREE U.S. AND ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE AGENTS WERE CARRIED OUT THIS MORNING. THEY ARE: AMBARKHUD AL-KARAM, ANIS ABBAS, AND PRIVATE MUHAMMAD RIDA HAYDAR.

END BBCMON 0550 8/9 G.T. (KY)

NNNN

PRAM

BBC B

B17 BAGHDAD EXECUTIONS: NAMES CORRECTED

(WITH B7)

NE
ACCORDING TO THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, THE NAMES OF THE FIRST
TWO +AGENTS+ REPORTED IN OUR B7 AS HAVING BEEN EXECUTIED IN
BAGHDAD THIS MORNING SHOULD READ QANBAR KHUDAR KARAM AND
ALMAZ ABBAS (CORRECTING FIRST PART OF EACH NAME.)

END BBC MON 1143 8/9 JM (KY) (TVN)

- 9 SEP 1969

Cutting dated 19

IRAQ EXECUTES 'SPIES'

By Our Staff Correspondent
in Beirut

Three more executions were carried out in Baghdad yesterday bringing the total of so-called spies hanged or shot in Iraq this year to 54.


Radio Baghdad said the three men, two civilians and a soldier, had been convicted of spying for American Central Intelligence Agency and for Israel.

Mr. Thichette

Reg. 10

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CONFIDENTIAL



117

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
29 AUG 1969

~~29~~ AUG 1969

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD. NEG 1/1

22 August, 1969.

(1/3)

then

late ✓.

29/8

M^r Hirschel
Euter

Dear Peter,

I agree with the last sentence
of this letter. ~~AM~~ 28
X

pa. Jan 18/9

Iraq Internal

A reliable contact has told me the following story. Colonel Aziz Amin, Iraqi Military Attaché in Tehran, recently visited Baghdad. He is a Mosulawi and he heard, during his leave, of the dismissal of another Mosulawi who had a good army record. Before returning to Tehran he paid a visit to the Chief of Staff, General Hamid Shehab. On his first attempt to see the General he was unable to get in and remained in the outer office. Here he ran into another Mosulawi officer and they started talking about the dismissed Mosulawi. Colonel Aziz Amin said in a loud voice that it was all nonsense and he would speak to the Chief of Staff about it. He then added "We Mosulawis must stand together".

2. On the following day Colonel Aziz Amin was able to see Shehab, who greeted him with the words "What was it you were saying yesterday?" Amin repeated what he had said in the outer office but Shehab told him that a serious charge had been brought against him and that he would have to go and see President Bakr. Accordingly the General and Amin went to the President where it transpired that a report had been submitted by three officers (Captain Nahid Ismail, the Chief of Staff's Secretary, and one other) accusing Amin of saying "We Mosulawis must stand together and get the Baath out". Amin denied that he had said any such thing but was subjected to a long interrogation. The other officers were also interrogated and Captain Nahid Ismail eventually admitted that he had gone along with the other two to "frame" Amin.

3. When they had returned to the Ministry of Defence and Amin had been cleared, he told Shehab that he was fed up with the degree of supervision to which he was subjected in Tehran. He complained that his Sergeant Clerk kept a check on all his movements, and all his telephone calls and even the number of times he went to see the Ambassador. Shehab then replied "And what do you think of my position, when I have a secretary like that sitting outside my office? All the senior officers are submitted to the same sort of surveillance by young Baathists but may be there will be a change by the end of the year."

4. This

J. P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL



4. This story is probably symptomatic of a growing feeling amongst the senior officers of resentment at the conduct of the young Baathists. It is, however, only one element in the very complex situation which now pertains in Baghdad. Since the revolutions of 17 and 30 July 1968 there have been numerous rumours - some soundly based - of attempted and impending coups. We are now going through a period when such rumours are rife again.

5. The strange thing is that no one really appears to know what is happening at present. There are the usual stories about difficulties between Hardan Tikriti and Ammash, but these are old hat and have been heard consistently for the last year. There are also suggestions that Saddam al Tikriti, the strong doctrinaire Secretary General of the Regional Command, is attempting to outflank Hardan al Tikriti and the old guard of more moderate elements. Then there are reputedly difficulties between the International (Qaumi) Command of the Baath Party in Baghdad, notably Shibli al Aisimi and Abdul Khaliq Samurrai, and the Regional Command of the Baath Government. Ahram Hourami and Michel Aflaq have both been in Baghdad recently, reputedly to make arrangements for the next International Congress of the Party which is scheduled to be held in Baghdad in the near future. They are also reported to have attempted to mediate between the different factions in the Baath leadership.

6. So much for the internal divisions, but there are also external activities against the regime. Abdul Razak al Nayyif has apparently been active in Beirut and made damaging allegations about President Bakr and the regime here. It is probably this, as much as anything, which has spurred the Baghdad Government to take action against Lebanon (my telegram No. 729). In addition the Shia, no doubt encouraged by the Iranians, and the Nasserists, appear to be making clandestine plans against the government. Mulla Mustafa and his Kurds remain in vehement opposition while Talabani too seems to be becoming somewhat disenchanted with the Baath.

7. After his return from Abu Dhabi on 8 August, little was heard of General Hardan Tikriti. Some observers read considerable significance into this, particularly in view of Saddam's reported attempt to out-manoeuvre him. It is also widely believed that an attempt on Hardan Tikriti's life was made on 18 July. This and the interruption to the programme in the Khuld Hall on the same evening when a man seized the microphone and attacked President Bakr and Tikriti were probably the work of extremists amongst the Right Wing Baath or possibly even Left Wing Baath. There have been similar periods in the past when little has been heard of one Deputy Prime Minister or the other, and after a while he has

/reappeared

CONFIDENTIAL



reappeared on the scene apparently with as much confidence as ever. Tikriti again confounded the rumour-mongers by reappearing and presiding over a meeting of the Council of Ministers this week.

8. Nonetheless there is some mystery about the replacement of Brigadier Mohammad Kassab as Commander of the Air Force by Colonel Hayawi. The new Commander might not be expected to be any friend of Hardan Tikriti's since he was imprisoned by Hardan twice in the past - once in November 1963 and again on 17 July 1968. It could, therefore, be that he is Saddam's man, although it is perhaps more likely that Hardan Tikriti changed his attitude towards him and that the appointment was the result of Party consensus with Hardan's agreement. At all events Hayawi is another Tikriti.

So were most of the officers!

9. It is not the object of this letter to make any prognostications, but I thought you would like to know of these rumours that something might be about to happen. There is nothing new in all this. In fact one has a strong sense of déjà vu. However, if the regime does not stick firmly together, there are perhaps four possibilities:

- (a) A coup by Hardan Tikriti and the moderate elements, which would lead to cooperation with moderate elements now in opposition;
- (b) A coup by the younger and more "progressive" members of the Party in which Saddam al Tikriti would play a leading part as a move to neutralise the more moderate.
- (c) An internal coup by the Amash faction, possibly using the followers of Saddam al Tikriti as allies; and
- (d) An attempt by e.g. Nasserists, Communists, Barazanists and Shia or even Left-Wing Baathists outside opposition elements to seize power.

However we at present see no reason to alter our previous assessments that the regime, despite their differences, are likely to stay together and that for the time being they seem to have neutralised their potential enemies.

Yours Ever

Donald

(D. F. Hawley)


CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 1/1

Al-Bakr ill

BEIRUT, Monday, Cables.
EGYPTIAN President Gamal, Abdul Nasser's special physician arrived in Baghdad today to examine Iraqi President General Hassan al-Bakr who is reported gravely ill. Radio Baghdad which broadcast the news tonight did not mention the nature of Bakr's illness.

The Iraqi President is believed to have been taken seriously ill last week when he was expected to attend a meeting of four Arab heads of state in Cairo.



CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

27 September 1969.

118
Am 3.10
Mr. Acland
News Dept, Miss Collings
BA
11/10

Dear Sir,

Secret Trials

There has been a fresh crop of stories about the trial of Abdul Rahman Bazzaz and Ibrahim Faisal al Ansari.

15 years each.
2. It is very difficult to establish exactly what has happened because of discrepancies in the various accounts. It is, however, reasonably certain that the trials have taken place, but it is not clear what sentences were pronounced. One version is that Bazzaz has been given ten years and Ansari five, while other versions have mentioned much longer sentences for both men. We have heard, on quite reliable authority, that although on the evidence given an acquittal of Bazzaz was expected, his trial was in other respects fairly conducted. One of the more optimistic views expressed is that he might be pardoned after a reasonable time. But the fact remains that the men are still in prison, and despite advance billing by the authorities, Bazzaz has still not appeared on television.

3. We shall of course let you know if or when we hear anything more substantial. In the meantime, and unless there is any official announcement here, I trust that nothing will be done to draw the attention of the British press to these rumours. ?

Yours ever-

Burti

(A.E. Saunders)


P.R.M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.,
London, S.W.1.

PAHMA
27/10

CONFIDENTIAL

The Times is already
obsessed with this subject
to an irrational degree,
& certainly nothing should be
done to stimulate publicity.

10/10.3
x



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Please
(Michaelis)

PMA

(for entry in the files)

28/10

done

WONFO 031/24

[Adv. N. Karlin Dept]

RR FCO

EN CLAIR

ROUTINE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2883

BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 891 OF 22 OCTOBER.

GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD PLEASE SEND US A COPY OF ELLINGWORTH'S
LETTER ML 359/1 OF 15 OCTOBER TO HAWLEY.

MR. FREEMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

24 OCTOBER 1969

NEQ 1/1
119

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N. Karlin Dept 8.

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121

north of Kefar Gaza. 941, 942, 946 and 947/PLF and Sa'iqah: On the night of 11th-12th October Sa'iqah forces inflicted damage on the potash factory south of the Dead Sea. On the night of 16th-17th October another Sa'iqah group inflicted casualties on an ambush position in the Junaydiyah area. The same night another group destroyed a half-track and inflicted casualties on a camp in the Shuwayir area. On 16th October PLF forces destroyed a half-truck and inflicted casualties near the Kefar Ruppin settlement. On the night of 13th-14th October they damaged a bus and inflicted casualties on its occupants in Gaza. The same night a tracked vehicle was destroyed by a mine between Gaza and Jabaliyah. On the night of 16th-17th October a vehicle was damaged and casualties inflicted in the Abadilah area of Khan Yunis. The same night another vehicle was damaged and casualties inflicted in the Abu Abbas area of Khan Yunis. ("Voice of Fatah" in Arabic 18.30 GMT 17.10.69)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

21 OCT 1969

NEQ III

Code Messages (Text of new messages) [Messages i-vi of 16.10.69 repeated.]

(i) From the blooming roses to the gardener: promise. (ii) From alif waw to Saqr: deliver the present to as-Sabir. (iii) From mim ayn to 900; the present has arrived; follow up. (iv) From Al-Falih to Nasr ad-Din Abu Mansur: shake hands with jawhar; our greetings. (v) From Rommel to seven: rest reassured; we have arrived. ("Voice of Fatah" in Arabic 18.30 GMT 17.10.69)

Reports in Brief

Reports of Iraqi military "purge" (Text) The ruling Ba'thist authorities in Iraq are continuing their purge of officers whose loyalty they doubt. The purge takes such forms as charges of treason, assassinations, torture until death, as in the case of the late Maj-Gen. Muhammad Nuri Khalil, and retirement. The Ba'thist authorities recently issued a list of 49 officers to be retired. These include Group Capt. Taha Ahmad, Air Cmdr. Abdullah Mustafa Asim, Air Cmdr. Abd al-Mun'im Isma'il, Col Isa Rahumi, Col Subhi Mahmud and Fl. Off. Mustafa Ahmad. (Ahwaz in Arabic 21.20 GMT 17.10.69)

Report of E German military aid to Iraq (Text) According to reports from Baghdad, an Iraqi Government and Ba'th Party delegation went to Moscow a few weeks ago to ask for guerrilla warfare experts to help the Ba'thist rulers crush the revolution in northern Iraq and for experts to help the Party's intelligence cells track down opponents and rivals to the regime. Moscow, however, passed the request to the GDR, and the GDR agreed. The first group of GDR experts has already arrived and begun its duties in northern Iraq. Since the opening of the GDR Embassy in Baghdad two GDR experts have been directing Iraqi military intelligence. These two are attached to the Embassy. They meet the Ba'thists at the military intelligence department of the Iraqi Defence Ministry. The Ba'th Government has also sent a group of Party members to the GDR to train in intelligence, torture and forcing information out of suspects. (Ahwaz in Arabic 21.20 GMT 17.10.69)

Fighting in Iraqi Kurdistan On 14th October an Ilyushin and two Hawker Hunter aircraft attacked the (Ghusun) area. Our machine-guns intercepted them. We suffered no losses in life. At 12.00 on 15th October, an Ilyushin raided the command again. It was shot down by our anti-aircraft guns. The first battalion reports: On 12th October, one of our detachments attacked an assault position east of (Mudlah) village. Three Iraqi soldiers were killed. On the night of 13th-14th October, our heavy artillery inflicted heavy losses on (Shewarak) Camp. The sixth battalion reports: On the night of 15th-16th October, our artillery shelled large groups of mercenaries trying to cross the Diyala river. The Peshmargas then silenced them with small arms fire. ("Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan" in Arabic 15.40 GMT 17.10.69)

Iraqi delegation to Hungary and Soviet Union The head of the Iraqi General Federation of Labour, Muhammad Ayish, has left Baghdad with a delegation to represent Iraq at the WFTU conference in Budapest. After the conference Ayish and two members of the delegation will go to Moscow to attend the celebrations of the 52nd October Revolution anniversary. (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 10.30 GMT 17.10.69)

Jordanian Red Crescent delegation to Soviet Union A delegation of the Jordanian Red Crescent Society under Dr. Ahmad Abu Qurah, left on 17th October for Moscow at the invitation of the USSR Red Cross Society. The delegation is carrying films and pictures portraying the tragedy of the evacuees and the Israeli acts against Arab inhabitants in the occupied areas. (Amman in Arabic 16.00 GMT 17.10.69)

Numayri's return to Khartoum Maj-Gen. Numayri and his delegation arrived in Khartoum on 16th October after a five-day inspection visit to Kassala Province. (Omdurman in Arabic 17.00 GMT 16.10.69)

Remission of S Yemeni prison sentences Salim Rubay Ali, Chairman of the Presidential Council, has announced the reduction of prison sentences on a number of prisoners including the release of some from the Aden central prison on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the 14th October revolution. (Aden in Arabic 15.00 GMT 17.10.69)

Israeli relations with France (Excerpts) The Foreign Ministry spokesman told our reporter this morning [17.10.69] that he knows nothing of a reported official visit by Foreign Minister Abba Eban to France in three months' time. A report to this effect quoting French sources was carried in the morning's press. The Israel Foreign Ministry has made it plain that France has not approached the Israel Government about returning the money paid for the Mirage planes. The spokesman said that all the information on this was based on newspaper reports. (Israel in English 11.30 GMT 17.10.69)

End of Israeli dock strike Haifa port is back to normal this morning [17.10.69]. Sixteen ships are in port with four more waiting in the bay. There is still a great deal of congestion at Ashdod port after the two-day strike there this week. (Israel in English 11.30 GMT 17.10.69)

Fighting in Iraqi Kurdistan On 14th October an Iraqi and two Hawker Hunter aircraft attacked the (Gusani) area. Our machine-guns intercepted them. We suffered no losses in life. At 12.00 on 14th October, an Iranian raiding force of 100 men was shot down by our anti-aircraft guns. The first battalion reported: On 13th October, one of our detachments attacked an enemy position east of (Mudhar) village. Three Iraqi soldiers were killed. On the night of 13th-14th October, our heavy artillery inflicted heavy losses on (Shewarsk) Camp. The sixth battalion reported: On the night of 13th-14th October, our artillery shelled large groups of mercenaries trying to cross the Diyala river. The Bedonkars then attacked them with small arms fire. ('Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan' in Arabic 15.40 GMT 17.10.69)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

- 4 NOV 1969

THE SUN

NEQ 11/1

Cutting dated

3 NOV 1969

19

HENRY FIELDING

The passport

A BRITISH passport still means something, it seems. Prince Faisal, 25-year-old pretender to the throne of Iraq and cousin of King Faisal who was assassinated in 1958, wants to get into his country to bring his two young children to England.

To safeguard himself he has applied for British citizenship and a British passport.

Although Prince Faisal is a millionaire in Iraq, owning land the size of Sussex, he cannot get his money out. He is now working as a laboratory technician at London University for £16 a week.

He and his English wife are living in a £4 5s. a week bed-sitter in North London.

Prince Faisal said yesterday: "I am beginning to fear for my children's safety.

"My passport issued by the Iraq Government expires in March. If I return there I might disappear. With a British passport I would have some safeguard."

His son, five, and daughter, four, are children of his first marriage, dissolved two years ago.

Mr. Hinchcliffe

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Reg. de.

Tray inter

PM
3/12

RESTRICTED

*Mr Yarnall J. 7.11.
re Affair in 12/11
then reg. & a*



RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-6 NOV 1969

NEQ 1/1

British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

3 November, 1969.

125

Dear Peter,

Balfour Day

Perhaps it would be unfair to describe the celebration yesterday of the Balfour Declaration as a damp squib; it was clearly not designed to be more than token homage to that "ill-starred" memory. Demonstrations are reported to have taken place throughout Iraq; the demonstration in Baghdad was fairly large and followed the approved route from Maidan Square to Tahrir Square which the masses of the people now seem to tread with monotonous regularity. During the afternoon the guard at the Embassy gates was reinforced purely, we were assured, as a precautionary measure. The bridges across the river were closed, and, in fact, no part of the demonstration crossed to our side of the river. On reaching Tahrir Square the demonstrators heard a speech the theme of which was the Palestine question, but the emphasis was very much on the future conduct of "the struggle" and Britain was not mentioned even once. All the papers have had some editorial comment on Balfour Day; they did not spare us our responsibility but did not labour the subject as only they know how. The Government and people of Iraq have therefore duly ~~marked~~ the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration but it was taken as an opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to the Arab cause in Palestine and to criticise the "agents of imperialism" in the Lebanon rather than as an opportunity to express criticism or hostility to Britain.

Yours sincerely

Mike

(M. K. Jenner)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

c.c.

P. Joy, Esq.,
BEIRUT.

RESTRICTED

7 NOV 1969

Cutting dated 19

Missing ex-Premier

CONCERN is mounting among both his English and Arab friends about the fate of Dr Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz, Iraqi Ambassador here from 1963 to 1965. Little has been heard of him since his arrest by Iraq's Baathist Government was announced in December.

Early this year he was seen going under guard from prison to the dentist, but this was thought to be a means to kill the rumour started by a Kuwaiti newspaper that he had died or been executed.


Last month it was reported that he had been sentenced to 15 years' im-



Dr al-Bazzaz: no news

prisonment, but there has been no news of a trial and no confirmation of the sentence. He is not in good health and long imprisonment would endanger his life.

His arrest, on obscure charges of association with the CIA, has a ring of absurdity. Well known as an ardent nationalist before the 1958 revolution, he left London to become deputy Prime Minister and then Prime Minister of a revolutionary Government up to August, 1966.



Mr Hinchcliffe

Reg & M
Iraq internal

RM
7/11

Pa

NEQ 1/1

ME/W543/A1/3

Habbaniyah military housing A large housing project was begun at Habbaniyah barracks on 20th October. Some 300 old billets will be demolished, and modern quarters will be built in their place for non-commissioned officers serving with the Iraqi forces on the eastern front. (Baghdad in Arabic 11.30 GMT 20.10.69)

IRACQ

Release of former government officials The Revolution Command Council has released eight former government officials from prison and cancelled the remainder of their sentences. They are retired Brig-Gen. Abd al-Hadi ar-Rawi, Abd al-Latif al-Kamali, Subhi as-Sa'ud, Salim (al-Majul), Isma'il al-Abdali, Hatim Hasan al-Yasin, Abd al-Al al-Araji and Sabbar Subhi Muhammad Sa'id. They had been sentenced by the court of the Revolution for plotting against the regime. (INA in Arabic 09.48 GMT 26.10.69)

IRAN Economic co-operation with USSR Speaking at the opening of the second international Asian trade fair in Teheran, the Soviet Ambassador, Yerosyev, said that over the last three years, trade between the Soviet Union and Iran had increased nearly four-fold. The category of goods exchanged had been considerably widened. Nearly one quarter of all goods supplied to the USSR by Iran were manufactured products from Iran's industries. A group of Soviet experts will soon arrive in Iran to draw up joint proposals on developing Soviet-Iranian economic co-operation and trade for the next 10, 12 and 15 years. It is hoped, this year, to draw up a new draft agreement on trade and payments for 1971-75. (Moscow home service 10.30 GMT 23.10.69)

THE IRAQI CABINET
(AS ON 30 JULY, 1969)

Saiyid Ahmad Hasan al Bakr	Prime Minister
Air Force General Hardan Abdul Ghaffar al Tikriti	Deputy Premier and Minister of Defence.
1st General Salih Mahdi Ammash	Deputy Premier and Minister of the Interior.
Saiyid Abdul Karim Abdul Sattar al Shaikhli	Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Saiyid Amin Abdul Karim	Minister of Finance.
Saiyid Mahdi al Dola'i	Minister of Justice
Dr. Ahmad Abdul Sattar al Jawari	Minister of Education
Saiyid Anwar Abdul Qadir al Hadithi	Minister of Labour and Social Affairs.
Dr. Izzat Mustafa	Minister of Health
Saiyid Abdullah Sallum	Minister of Culture and Information.
* Saiyid Mahmud Sheet Khattab	Minister of Communications.
Dr. Abdul Husain al Attiyah	Minister of Agriculture
Dr. Maulud Kamil Abid	Minister of Agrarian Reform.
Dr. Taha Ibrahim al Abdullah	Minister of Irrigation
...	Minister of Works and Housing
Dr. Jawad Hashim	Minister of Planning
Dr. Fakhri Yasin Qadduri	Minister of Economy
Saiyid Khalid Makki al Hashimi	Minister of Industry
Dr. Rashid al Rifa'e	Minister of Oil and Minerals
Dr. Ghayib Mawlood Mukhlis	Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs.
Saiyid Shafiq al Kamali	Minister of Youth Welfare
...	Minister of North Affairs
Dr. Abdullah al Khudhayir	Minister of Unity and Acting Minister of North Affairs.
* Saiyid Adnan Ayoub Sabri	Minister of State
Saiyid Hamid al Juburi	Minister of State for Presidential Affairs.
Saiyid Taha Muhyiddin	Minister of State and Acting Minister of Works & Housing.
Dr. Hamad Dalli al Karbuli	Minister of State for Awqaf Affairs.

- * Saiyid Mahmud Sheet Khattab is understood to have been absent from his office for some 4 months. Saiyid Adnan Ayoub Sabri is acting Minister of Communications. No official announcement of this has been made.

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THE TIMES

- 8 NOV 1969

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REGISTRY No. 10
12 NOV 1969

NEQ 111

INTRIGUING reports are trickling into London about Dr. Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz, the former Iraqi Prime Minister and ambassador to London who was arrested by the Baathist regime at the end of last year on the unlikely charges of spying for Israel and the United States.

Bazzaz has been seen being hustled out of the Baghdad Central Prison, according to one report, and spotted arriving at Beirut airport on an Iraqi military aircraft from which he was escorted to the V.I.P. lounge, according to another. Unfortunately for Bazzaz's many friends in this country, these reports remain unconfirmed.

What does seem certain is that Bazzaz has been receiving better treatment than he did immediately after his arrest. According to an English businessman who recently arrived here from Baghdad, Bazzaz was being allowed to receive a large number of visitors in prison. Edith Penrose, Professor of Economics at the School of Oriental Studies, who has Bazzaz's son, Amir, among her students, said her latest information was that Bazzaz was "in prison but not being badly treated."

Probably the most optimistic factor is the apparent softer line the Iraqi regime now appears to be following. This week 21 prisoners held on charges of spying for Israel were acquitted; and over the past few months there have been several "reappearances" of prominent Iraqis. One of the most notable, Adib al-Jadr, former chairman of the National Iraq Oil Co., who was arrested immediately after the coup last year, recently turned up in London.

THE TIMES DIARY

Bazzaz: is he free? •

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Iraq Internal

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Country Assessment Sheet

Iraq

Section IV. Essential Facts

* See Notes below

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Iraq Internal

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Serial

Year

A - BASIC

1	Area	1969	171,600 sq. miles
2	Capital	1969	Baghdad
3	Population (a) total (b) average annual rate of increase 1957-65	1968	9 million (approximate figure) 3%
4	Religion(s)	1969	Shia and Sunni Muslim, Christian (Nestorian, Catholic Orthodox) (about 2,000 Jews)
5	Official language(s)	1969	Arabic, Kurdish
6	Form of government	1969	Republic
<u>B - DEFENCE</u>			
7	Proportion of G.N.P.	1967	12.5%
8	* (a) Navy	1969	600 men. 4 old river gun boats 8 inshore patrol craft 12 Komar FPBs 2 Mine sweepers 2 Torpedo Recovery vessels
	(b) Army	1969	80,000 men (40,000 Post Service Reservists) 550 Tanks

/ (c)

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Year

(c) Air Force

1969

4,000 men
350 aircraft
95 fairly modern fighters
70 obsolete fighters

(d) Police (? para-military or not)

1969

10,000 men including Civil Police Force and para military force "national guard" which is a private army run by the Ba'ath party. Called out at times of national emergency. The Ba'ath party also runs an efficient secret police. (a branch of the Security Services).

9 Alliances or Treaties

1952

Member of the Eastern Command with Syria and Jordan. Member of the largely defunct Unified Arab Command

C - ECONOMIC

10 Currency exchange rates

1969

10 = £1. 3. 4. (established November 1967), 2.80 U.S.\$ (established 1962)

11 G.D.P. at constant 1962 cost (IM.F. figure)

- (a) total
- (b) av. annual rate of growth (at constant prices)
- (c) per capita

1966

U.S. \$ 2363 million (IBRD statistics)

1965-68

4%

1966

U.S. \$293

12 Overall trade (a) exports, f.o.b.
(b) main export commodities (as a percentage of (a) (1))

1967

(1) Exports (excluding oil) US \$56 million
(ii) Oil exports (income to government) US \$427 million
Dates 28% Raw Wool 7% Cement 15%
Barley 13% Raw Cotton 5%

(c) principal markets

1967

Saudi Arabia 11%
Lebanon 15%
U.S.A. 6%
Communist China 10%
Kuwait 17.5%

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/India

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Year

India 6%
U.K. 2.5%

(d) imports, c.i.f.

1967

U.S. \$423 million

(e) principal suppliers

1967

U.K. 14.3%
West Germany 11.6%
Japan 6.5%
U.S.S.R. 4.7%
Italy 4.5%

13 Balance of payments (a) goods and services

1967

U.S. \$ 21.6 million

(b) trade balance, f.o.b.

1967

U.S. \$146 million

14 Official reserves

1969

U.S. \$452 million

15 Aid (a) donor or recipient

(June)

1969

Recipient

(b) amount (to or from where and in
what proportions)

1969

Unknown amount of Soviet military aid
U.S. \$ 84 million loan from GDR

1967

IBRD \$7.71 million, Kuwait U.S. \$14 million
U.N. Agencies U.S. \$ 2.55 million

1968

Soviet aid approximately U.S. \$120 million
(mostly military)

D - BRITISH INVOLVEMENT

Politics/Defence

16 Treaty or quasi-treaty

1969

None

17 Defence facilities available to U.K.

1969

None

18 *Military assistance from U.K.

1969

£0

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Serial

Year

19	Diplomatic representation (excluding DWS staff and other Departments' staff)		27 U.K. based staff
	Cost of Diplomatic representation		£313,000
20	British Council expenses in Iraq (revenue)	1969/70	£35,057
		1969/70	£530
21	Resident Community	1969	954 (including wives and children of Iraqis)
<u>Economic</u>			
22	U.K. trade (a) exports + re-exports (f.o.b.)	1968	£16 million (3% total British exports)
	(b) Imports (c.i.f.)	1968	£25.8 million (3% total U.K. imports)
23	* Aid (a) capital	1969	£0
	(b) technical assistance	1969	£3,000 (estimate) £2,995 m. 1968

E - ANY SPECIAL ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Iraq, like most other Arab countries, enforces the regulations of the Arab Boycott Office. Thus, trade is banned with Israel and Iraq also has widened the embargo to include (as she sees it) the main supporters of Israel, the U.S.A. and the Federal Republic of Germany.

As a temporary measure Iraq has banned trade with those countries with which she has an unfavourable trade balance. At present these are:- Italy, Japan and Hong Kong.

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Country Assessment Sheet

IRAQ

Section I

British Objectives in Iraq

The main British investment in Iraq is the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). This is a British registered company ^{in which} ~~owned by~~ Shell and B.I. ^{Together have a 47.5% holding} Apart from the IPC we have 47.5% lesser commercial and cultural interests. It ^{must be our aim} ~~is to our interest~~ to ensure insofar as we are able that Iraq does not slip further into the economic (and subsequently political) control of the Soviet Union.

2. Any improvement in Anglo/Iraqi relations, ^{which} ~~rarely better~~ ^{have been} ~~since 1958~~ ^{than} hardly satisfactory, are limited by the following main factors:

(a) no modification of our policy towards Israel is likely to go far enough to suit the Iraqis.

(b) we cannot force the IPC to settle its dispute with the Iraqi Government on Iraqi terms.

(c) We cannot supply Iraq with the sophisticated weapons in which she sometimes shows an interest.

(d) Iraq's repressive and occasionally barbaric acts provoke hostile comment in the British press and radio which tends to irritate the Iraqi regime.

3. Our main objectives therefore should be:-

(1) Assist in safeguarding our investment in the IPC (which is worth preserving but not at a price which would adversely affect the more important of the

/British

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British member companies elsewhere).

(2) Try to ensure that Iraq does not intervene to the detriment of British interests elsewhere. (Kuwait, Arab States of Persian Gulf, Jordan).

(3) Increase our share of the Iraqi market

(4) Develop (through the British Council) Anglo/Iraqi educational and cultural links.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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Section II

British Mission in Iraq: Direction of Effort

<u>Function</u>	<u>Output Budgeting Programme Category</u>	<u>Relative importance (percentage)</u>
International Organisation	1a	0
General representation VIPs	1b	5
Political interpretation	1b	21
Political negotiation (other than under 1A)	1b	10
Defence work (general)	1b	3
Public relations work in support of foregoing activities	1c	2
Defence sales	1d, IIa	8
Export promotion	IIa	20
Economic and commercial policy	IIb	12
Publicity for export promotion and economic publicity	IIc	6
Cultural work	IIId	2
Consular and immigration work	III, IVa	8
Aid	VI	3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECTION III: Economic and Political Structure

The Minister^{LIES} of Finance, Planning, Economy and Industry, in conjunction with the Ministry of Oil are responsible for the detailed planⁿing and day to day running of the Iraqi Economy under the general ^{SUPERVISOR} ~~suspension~~ of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath party. The Ba'ath party, ^{THROUGH} ~~by~~ its socialist principles, is committed to total nationalisation and the Government controls nearly all aspects of the Iraq economy. The present Iraqi government, like its predecessors, is aware that Iraq is over dependent on oil revenues and much of the annual development expenditure is aimed at improving the countries agricultural yield (e.g. by increasing the area of irrigated land) and embarking on a programme of industrialisation. However, ^{CONCENTRATION ON DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND AN INCREASING LARGELY} ~~CONCENTRATION ON DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND AN INCREASING LARGELY~~ ^{FRUSTRATED THESE PLANS.} ~~CONCENTRATION ON DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND AN INCREASING LARGELY~~

2. Power in Iraq, is theoretically wielded by the President acting with the advice of his Council of Ministers. In fact a Junta, ^{INFLUENTIAL} ~~mainly~~ composed of a few ~~many~~ individuals all except one of whom are drawn from the Regional (or Iraqi) command of the ruling Ba'ath party, rule the country. The Regional Command, in an uneasy alliance with the Minister of Defence, directly control the armed forces on whose support they must rely at the last analysis. The Ba'ath party has infiltrated the Civil Service and armed forces, and the security services are subject to the close control of the Regional Command.

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E. IRAQI PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION AMENDMENTS

Text of Amendments and Explanatory Note

Baghdad home service in Arabic 19.00 GMT 9.11.69

Text of report:

The Revolution Command Council today introduced some amendments to the Provisional Constitution [see ME/2883/E/1]. The following is the text of these amendments:

In accordance with the provisions of Article 92 of the Provisional Constitution, on the recommendation of the Revolution Command Council Chairman, and in view of necessity, we have decided to introduce the following amendments to the Provisional Constitution:

(1) Section (a) of Article 42 of the Provisional Constitution is cancelled.

(2) Section (a) of Article 43 of the Provisional Constitution is cancelled and replaced by the following:

Article 43, Section (a): The Revolution Command Council may by a two-thirds majority of its original members dismiss any of its members. The Council may by a two-thirds majority also include new members, provided that the total number of Council members does not exceed 15.

(3) The following is added to Article 43 as Section (d):

The Revolution Command Council may elect from among its members a Deputy President who will exercise the powers of the Revolution Command Council Chairman and President of the Republic in the event of his absence.

(4) (a) Section (d) of Article 44 is cancelled. (b) The phrase "Cabinet decisions" is deleted from Section (e) of Article 44.

(5) Article 50 of the Provisional Constitution is deleted and replaced by the following:

The President of the Republic is the Head of the State, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Chairman of the Revolution Command Council and the Head of the Government. He will: (a) appoint Ministers, accept their resignations, and dismiss them from their posts, the Ministers being responsible to the President in the performance of their duties and for their conduct; (b) approve international treaties and agreements, laws and regulations; (c) appoint, dismiss and pension off officials in accordance with the law; (d) appoint officers and pension them off in accordance with the law; (e) appoint governors, judges and political representatives and pension them off in accordance with the law; (f) receive the credentials of foreign representatives and international and diplomatic missions to the Iraqi Republic; (g) declare and end the state of emergency under conditions laid down by law.

(6) Article 60 of the Provisional Constitution is cancelled.

(7) Article 61 of the Provisional Constitution is deleted and replaced by the following:

The President of the Republic will exercise the powers of the Government assisted by a Council of Ministers. The Government is the executive and administrative authority and will be composed of the President of the Republic as chairman, his Deputies and Ministers. Each will have his special sphere in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and the regulations. The President may delegate one of his Deputies to head the Council of Ministers.

(8) [As heard] The phrase "Premier or" is deleted from Article 66.

(9) [As heard] Article 68 of the Provisional Constitution is cancelled and replaced by the following:

The Deputy Presidents or the Ministers may not, during their term of office, practice private professions, enter into commercial dealings, buy or lease anything belonging to the State, or sell their property to the State.

(10) Article 71 of the Provisional Constitution is cancelled.

(11) Article 95 is deleted and replaced by the following:

The President of the Republic issues this amendment to the Provisional Constitution and it will become effective from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

Written in Baghdad on 9th November 1969. Signed: The Revolution Command Council.

Explanatory note: The principle of collective leadership demands the expansion of the Revolution Command Council by the inclusion of leader members who participated in the 17th July 1968 revolution and who are still working to consolidate it. Also, the leader elements to be included in the Council have been and still are carrying out important duties in the Revolution Command Council together with the original members. Their inclusion will therefore be approval of the efforts they have made since 17th July.

Since the Provisional Constitution was published on 21st September 1968, the President has also been Premier. This situation is still unchanged. Although the Provisional Constitution did not oppose this, it was decided to make these adjustments in the Constitution.

The challenges which Iraq and the Arab nation are facing at the hands of imperialism, Zionism and their allies make it necessary for us to meet them with wisdom, determination and a strong hand capable of running the Government, fulfilling the revolution's mission and defeating its enemies. This can be effected by making the system a presidential one in line with present conditions in our country.

Press Comment on Constitution Amendments

Baghdad home service in Arabic 06.00 GMT 10.11.69

Excerpts from press review quotations of newspaper articles:

['Ath-Thawrah':] At the important meeting of the Revolution Command Council yesterday, comrade members of the Ba'th Party Regional Command and Iraqi members of the National Command were included in the Council and Comrade Saddam Husayn was elected Deputy Chairman. The comrades who were officially added to the Council following the amendment of certain provisions of the Provisional Constitution are those

who have been and still are playing a leading part in the Council together with the original members. The official addition of the new members to the Council is constitutional confirmation of a reality which has existed since the emergence of the great revolution...

The Party Regional Command consists of 11 members elected at the regional conference, which represents all the Party strugglers in the country. After the 17th July revolution the number of Command members increased from nine to 11 in accordance with the Party statute providing that the number of the Party Regional Command members when the Party was in power should be 11. The National Command is elected by the national conference, which represents all the Party strugglers in the Arab homeland and abroad. It is worth noting that four Iraqi comrades are members of both commands simultaneously and that one Iraqi comrade member of the National Command holds only one leading position.

It is understood that the Secretary of the Regional Command is Comrade Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, President of the Republic, Chairman of the Revolution Command Council, Chief of Staff of the armed forces, and Head of the Government. The Assistant Secretary is Comrade Saddam Husayn, who was yesterday elected Deputy Chairman of the Revolution Command Council.

['Al-Jumhuriyah':] The third amendment of the Provisional Constitution constitutes an important new step to concentrate the revolutionary power in 17th July Iraq, to strengthen its effectiveness, and to define its prerogatives in a manner compatible with the conditions and the great tasks facing the progressive march of our working masses.

The inclusion in the Revolution Command Council of leading figures who have contributed to the planning and execution of the revolution for unity, freedom and socialism is an expression of true appreciation of their sincere efforts to consolidate the revolution's national and progressive policies in the present critical conditions...

Obviously, the new amendment and the adoption of the presidential system shows that the 17th July revolution, under the Socialist Ba'th Party leadership, has overcome one of its most difficult stages - that of consolidating power and basing it on sound revolutionary principles consistent with the magnitude of the revolution's tasks at the regional and national levels.

The confirmation of the revolutionary rule on the basis of collective leadership clearly shows that the July revolution has in a practical way laid the foundation of a new phase characterised by determination to implement all the revolution's programmes both at home and abroad in accordance with the principle of democratic government and with the definitions of the prerogatives of power as laid down in the recent amendment of the Constitution.

PM

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BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 943 11 NOVEMBER 1969

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 943 OF 11 NOVEMBER, RFI BEIRUT
CAIRO AMMAN KUWAIT BAHRAIN AND JEDDA AND SAVING TO
WASHINGTON.



IRAQ'S CONSTITUTION.

PAPERS OF 10 NOVEMBER CARRY TEXT OF 'THIRD
OF INTERIM CONSTITUTION' ADOPTED BY THE
REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (RCC) AT MEETING OF 9
NOVEMBER.

2. THE PRINCIPAL EFFECTS ARE :-

(A) TO PERMIT THE RCC TO HAVE UP TO 15 MEMBERS. (IT HAD
PREVIOUSLY CONSISTED OF PRESIDENT BAKR AND FOUR
OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS. NOT ALL OF THEM BA'ATHISTS).
UNNAMED MEMBERS OF THE BA'ATH PARTY REGIONAL COMMAND AND
IRAQI MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMAND ARE DECLARED TO HAVE
BEEN ELECTED TO FILL THE VACANCIES-

(B) TO INCREASE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND FUNCTIONS
OF PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC. THUS HEADSHIP OF
GOVERNMENT IS ADDED TO HIS EXISTING EX OFFICIO FUNCTIONS,
WHILE PRIME MINISTER'S POST IS ABOLISHED : AND CONTROL OF ALL
PUBLIC AND MILITARY APPOINTMENTS IS NOW VESTED PERSONALLY IN HIM
INSTEAD OF IN THE R C C:

(C) TO ESTABLISH NEW POST OF
VICE-CHAIRMAN OF R C C WHO 'WILL ASSUME PREROGATIVES
OF THE CHAIRMAN ADD THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC IN HIS ABSENCE.'
TO THIS POST SADDAM HUSSAIN (ASCENDANT YOUNG
CIVILIAN PARTY LEADER) HAS BEEN ELECTED.

3. THE PREAMBLE TO THE AMENDMENT DECLARES IN SO MANY WORDS THAT THE FORMAL CHANGES IN THE POSITION OF THE RCC AND THE PREROGATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT MERELY CONSTITUTIONALISE THE EXISTING POSITION. WHILE THIS IS NO DOUBT LARGELY TRUE, THE PACKING OF THE RCC WITH PART MEMBERS BOTH INTENSIFIES THE PARTY'S MONOPOLY OF POWER AND PLACES THE TWO OR THREE NON-PARTY MEMBERS OF THE ORIGINAL BODY IN AN EXPOSED POSITION. MOREOVER, SADDAM'S ASCENDANCY (PARAGRAPH 2(C)) CAN HARDLY BE WELCOME TO AMMASH AND TAKRITI UNLESS THEY ARE COMPENSATED IN SOME OTHER WAY.

4. REPORT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

FCO PASS BEIRUT CAIRO AMMAN

KUWAIT BALHRAIN JEDDA AND SAVING WASHINGTON

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION
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BALFOUR PAUL

DEPT. OF STATE

*Now
See
Memorandum
a. [Signature]
CSH*

Cutting dated 13 NOV 1969

NE Q 1/1 Mr. Hinchclife

Baathists secure firm grip on Iraq

From Our Middle East
Correspondent

Beirut, Nov. 12

After 18 months in which it has waged a ruthless campaign to emasculate its opposition, the Baathist regime in Iraq has given all but formal notice that it is no longer interested in a national political front to run the country.

This has become clear from a drastic change in the regime's constitution which incorporates the entire Iraq Baath Party leadership in the ruling Revolutionary Command Council.

In addition, Mr. Saddam Husain Takriti, the party's assistant secretary-general, be-

comes vice-president of the council, placing him second only to the President in the regime's power structure.

The stature of President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr himself, who is secretary-general of the Iraq Baath Party, has also been enhanced under what is called a "presidential system". As well as being head of state, he now assumes the premiership and becomes Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Under the decree, all 11 leaders of the party have been appointed to the Revolutionary Command Council whose size is expanded from five to 15. Since President Bakr and Lieutenant-General Saleh Mahdi Ammash the Interior Minister, both

belong to the national leadership as well as the ruling council, nine new members will, in fact, join it.

The remaining seat is to be filled by another Baathist, Mr. Chafiq al-Kemali, the Minister for Youth Affairs, who is a member of the Iraq-based international (pan-Arab) command of the Baath Party.

It is interesting to note that the three remaining ruling council members, who are not in the Baathist leadership, have considerable influence in the Armed Forces. A strategic position indeed in Iraq politics.

They are Air Marshal Hardan Takriti, the Defence Minister, Lieutenant-General Hammad Chehab, the Chief of Staff of

the Army, and Brigadier Saadoun Ghaidan, commander of the Baghdad garrison.

The decision to put the unequivocal Baathist stamp on the regime was undoubtedly taken at the congress of the pan-Arab command, held under Mr. Michel Aflak, the Syrian founder of the party and its leader, and of the national command, both of which were held in Baghdad in the past six weeks.

The regime seems, however, to be steering a much more moderate path, the mass acquittals in a recent batch of spy trials and the almost chidingly anti-guerrilla line taken in the Lebanon dispute being evidence of this.

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Mr. Aeland

Mr. Tripp

Constitutional changes in Iraq

Baghdad telegrams 944 and 943 attached are of some interest.

2. Saddam Hassan el Tekriti, since the revolution of July 1968, Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party Regional Command, and thought by some people to be the main eminent figure within the regime, is now established as a public figure in his own right and may indeed have emerged as the most powerful individual in Iraq. Very little is known about him, he has had the reputation of being a doctrinaire Ba'athist, inclined towards closer ties with the Soviet bloc and of the Mehdi Ammash faction, as opposed to the clique around General Hardan el Tikriti, the Minister of Defence. I suspect that, in fact, he is as good a trimmer as the next Iraqi and prepared to swallow political principles when they are at odds with advancement.

Personal

3. Saddam Hassan el Tekriti is now the official number two as Deputy to the President. General Tikriti and Mehdi Ammash are not only demoted in the official pyramid, they also, with the abolition of the post of Prime Minister, lose their titles of Deputy Prime Minister. However, it is possible that they may both be compensated in some way for their public demotion.

4. Her Majesty's Ambassador points out (paragraph 3 of Baghdad telegram number 943) that this is presented as a step to regularise the existing position. In effect, the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party has taken over the Revolutionary Command Council (the Cabinet in Iraq) and will now be the de jure and well as the de facto Government. Thus the door appears firmly and finally closed on the prospects of other political groupings, i.e. the Nasserites and the communists sharing the fruits of power.

5. H.M.A. has also pointed out that non-Ba'ath Party members remaining on the expanded Revolutionary Command Council are now in an exposed position. He could well have in mind no less a figure than General Hardan Tikriti who barely subscribes to Ba'athist principles, indeed there is some doubt whether he is a member of the party at all, and certainly does not aspire to membership of the Regional

/Command.

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Command. However, he has the capacity for survival and as long as he continues to enjoy the support of the Air Force he should manage to hold his own.

6. I wonder what exactly is meant by paragraph 3 of Baghdad telegram number 944. If there is, for instance, some special unorthodox relationship between Saddam Hassan el Tekriti and the I.P.C., then the omens are favourable for the negotiations which may start in the latter half of this month.

(P.R.M. Hincheliffe)
12 November, 1969.

cc. Mr. Wallis (Oil Department)
Mr. Summerscale (Cabinet Office) +
Mr. Brown (P.U.S.D.)

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Background Note

IRAQ (Political Background)

1. Iraq since July 1968 has been ruled by the Ba'ath party (Pan-Arab, left wing Socialist). The present regime has shown itself ruthless at home at the expense of its image abroad. Potential opponents have been eliminated or effectively isolated; the Civil Service has been purged of unreliable elements; and the army, on whose support the existence of the regime depends, has been thoroughly infiltrated by Ba'ath party members of its nominees.
2. Iraq regimes are rarely long lived but the present one seems more capable of hanging on to power than its recent predecessors. However, the traditional problems facing Iraqi Governments are far from solved. The economy is sluggish. A high proportion of the money converted for development is in fact spent on defence. The dispute with the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) is still deadlocked. The perennial war with the Kurds in Northern Iraq, expensive and indecisive, continues sporadically. Sectarian feeling runs high with the Sunni Moslem minority, by tradition the ruling elite, ensuring that the Shia Moslem majority do not share in the fruits of power.
3. Abroad Iraq is resolutely intransigent over the dispute with Israel (with whom she is technically in a state of war). There are 20,000 Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan as the country's contribution to the Arab Eastern Command. She is at odds with her neighbour Syria, distrusted by most other Arab /countries

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countries and hostile (although less so in recent weeks) to Iran whose ambitions in the Gulf she fears and with whom she has a series of unsettled frontier disputes. Iraq also has ambitions in the Gulf and the British withdrawal in 1971 is seen as an opportunity for expanding her influence there.

4. Her relations with the Communist (Soviet) bloc are good. The Russians have replaced the United Kingdom as the main suppliers of military equipment to the Iraqi armed forces and have shown interest in increasing their influence in the country by giving Iraq technical and financial assistance on generous terms. There are some 250 Russian military advisers in Iraq and about 750 civilian technicians working on Soviet Aid projects. An unknown number of Iraqis are being trained in bloc countries. There are indications however that elements in the Regime are unhappy at the increasing influence of the bloc countries in Iraq and would wish to offset this by closer relations with the West.

Anglo/Iraq Relations

5. These have never been really satisfactory since the overthrow of the Iraqi Monarchy in 1958. Since July 1968 when the present regime seized power, Iraq's relations with this country have fluctuated widely and were very strained in the early part of this year. There have been signs recently however that influential members of the government (notably General Takriti, the Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister) would now welcome closer and more friendly ties with us.

6. Any significant improvement in Anglo/Iraqi relations are limited by the following main factors:-

- (a) no modification of our policy towards Israel is likely to go far enough to suit the Iraqis;
- (b) we cannot force the IPC to settle its dispute with the Iraqi Government on Iraqi terms;
- (c) we cannot supply Iraq with the sophisticated weapons in which she sometimes shows an interest;
- (d) Iraq's repressive and occasionally barbaric acts provoke hostile comment in the British press and radio which tends to irritate the Iraqi regime.

Personality Notes

GHAIK MAWLUD MUKHLIS (DR.)

Born at Tikrit 1932. After studying for a year at the Medical College at Baghdad he studied at Geneva where he graduated as a doctor in 1956. Obtained Diplomas in Public Hygiene and Tropical Diseases from English universities. Served at the Directorate of Students' Health, then became its Director. In 1963 appointed Director of Medical Services, then re-appointed to the Directorate of Students' Health. On 18 July 1968 became Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs.

The Mawlud Mukhlis family are right wing Ba'athist supporters: one of their daughters is married to Hardan Tikriti (the Minister of Defence). He is also politically close to Hardan Tikriti.

Well disposed towards Britain. A fluent French and good English speaker, he frequently represents the Government at National Days and similar occasions. Intelligent and urbane.

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Reg. P.O.

(132)

Int. Internal
PMM

Mr. Acland

Mr. Tripp

This is a useful & interesting analysis.

AA Acland
B/x

Yes. 98

13.11.

Constitutional changes in Iraq

--- Baghdad telegrams 944 and 943 attached are of some interest.

2. Saddam Hassan al Tekriti, since the revolution of July 1968, Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party Regional Command, and thought by some people to be the man eminent grise within the regime, is now established as a public figure in his own right and may indeed have emerged as the most powerful individual in Iraq. Very little is known about him, he has had the reputation of being a doctrinaire Ba'athist, inclined towards closer ties with the Soviet bloc and of the Mehdi Ammash faction, as opposed to the clique around General Hardan al Tikriti, the Minister of Defence. I suspect that, in fact, he is as good a trimmer as the next Iraqi and prepared to swallow political principles when they are at odds with advancement.

3. Saddam Hassan al Tekriti is now the official number two as Deputy to the President. General Tikriti and Mehdi Ammash are not only demoted in the official pyramid, they also, with the abolition of the post of Prime Minister, lose their titles of Deputy Prime Minister. However, it is possible that they may both be compensated in some way for their public demotion.

4. Her Majesty's Ambassador points out (paragraph 3 of Baghdad telegram number 943) that this is presented as a step to regularise the existing position. In effect, the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party has taken over the Revolutionary Command Council (the Cabinet in Iraq) and will now be the de jure and well as the de facto Government. Thus the door appears firmly and finally closed on the prospects of other political groupings, i.e. the Nasserites and the communists sharing the fruits of power.

5. H.M.A. has also pointed out that non-Ba'ath Party members remaining on the expanded Revolutionary Command Council are now in an exposed position. He could well have in mind no less a figure than General Hardan Tikriti who barely subscribes to Ba'athist principles, indeed there is some doubt whether he is a member of the party at all, and certainly does not aspire to membership of the Regional


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Command. However, he has the capacity for survival and as long as he continues to enjoy the support of the Air Force he should manage to hold his own.

6. I wonder what exactly is meant by paragraph 3 of Baghdad telegram number 944. If there is, for instance, some special unorthodox relationship between Saddam Hassan al Tekriti and the I.P.C., then the omens are favourable for the negotiations which may start in the latter half of this month.



(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)
12 November, 1969.

cc. Mr. Wallis (Oil Department) -
Mr. Summerscale (Cabinet Office)
Mr. Brown (P.U.S.D.)

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British Embassy,

BAGHDAD.

RECEIVED IN
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13 NOV 1969

NEC 11

6 November, 1969.

Iraq Internal

Al Thawra of 26 October reports the granting of a pardon to the following eight persons who had been convicted by the Revolutionary Court:-

Abdul Hadi Muhammad al-Rawi

Subhi Madhat al Sa'ud

Salim al Mujawwal al Mu'ini

Ismail Muhammad al-'Abdali

Hatam Hasan al Yasin

Abdul 'Adil Ali al 'Aaraji

Sabbar Subhi Muhammad Said

Abdul Latif al Kamali

2. Abdul Hadi al-Rawi (Leading Personalities in Iraq 1969 No. 6) is an ex Minister of Agriculture under the Arif régime who was arrested in September 1968 after leading an abortive coup of left-wing Ba'athists, Communists and Nasserists. Subhi Madhat al Sa'ud was at one time a senior Inspecting Officer of Police. Of the remaining six we have no record. No reason has been given for this pardon which has come as something of a surprise, particularly in the case of al-Rawi. The most likely reason, based purely on speculation, is that al-Rawi had been so badly tortured in prison as no longer to present a serious risk to the régime.

Yours sincerely
(M. K. Jenner)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

c.c.

P. Joy, Esq.,
Beirut.

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British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

8 November, 1969.



Acquittal of Iraqis charged with spying
for Iran and Israel

The press of 5 November gives banner headlines to the acquittal of 21 persons accused of spying for Iran and Israel. We had not previously heard of the case or of any of the accused who, with the exception of the former Director of Security in Basrah, seem to be of little importance. The alleged espionage activities were said to have taken place in or around Basrah, and the chief prosecution witness is himself serving a 15 year prison sentence for spying imposed in April 1968.

2. It seems possible from the evidence given that some of the accused were in fact engaged in smuggling and that their much publicised acquittal on a charge of espionage could be interpreted as being part of the process of improving relations between Iraq and Iran. Although some observers, including the Iranian Ambassador, have drawn this conclusion, the general impression created by the published version of the evidence does not seem on the face of it well calculated to serve such a purpose, since it does nothing to dispel the belief fostered by previous espionage cases that Iranian intelligence is playing an active and malevolent rôle in Iraqi affairs. Nevertheless, judged by the standards which apply in Iran/Iraq relations it certainly might be a propitiatory gesture.

3. You may however remember that in December 1968 General Hardan Takriti paid what appeared to be a successful visit to Iran and on his return spoke hopefully of relations between the two countries and of the visit which the Shah had been invited to pay to Iraq. Yet five days later the press was full of the confessions of two men whose stories were said to prove that the CENTO powers and Israel were conducting all manner of operations hostile to Iraq from Iranian Territory. It seems possible that the current disclosures of Iranian activities may similarly serve the aims of a faction within the régime which does not favour better relations with Iran, even though the effect is reduced because the alleged activities described took place at least eighteen months ago and those accused of having a part in them were acquitted.

4. Another theory is that the publicity given to the acquittals is designed to put Iraqi judicial procedures in a more favourable light. This could be because the image is still tarnished as a result of

/previous

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

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previous trials and the opportunity to take credit from some acquittals could be exploited. Another more sinister possibility is that the régime have thought it advisable to lay up credit in this way because they expect to have to draw on it when some of those known to be under arrest and charged with spying, and two of them have confessed publicly to spying, are convicted and sentenced.

Yours sincerely
M. K. Jenner
(M. K. Jenner)

c.c.

M. C. S. Weston,
TEHRAN.

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17 NOV 1969

NEB III

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PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS HELD AT AUB ON BALFOUR DAY

AUB

Girl Hijacker of TWA Plane Addresses Student Rally at University

Pro-commando students at the American University of Beirut held a peaceful demonstration on Saturday inside the campus grounds to protest the entry of "elements" from outside the university earlier in the week during clashes with anti-commando students. The clashes earlier resulted in injury of 6 students. The Saturday march was also held in protest against the Balfour Declaration, when 52 years ago Lord Balfour of Britain promised to grant Palestine as a national home for the Jews. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had appealed on Saturday to all resistance groups not to demonstrate in observance of the Balfour Declaration. The appeal said Arab unity faced a far more dangerous threat from "Zionist imperialist conspiracy than the danger of the Balfour Declaration."

The Student March at AUB ended peacefully as a result of heavy rains which dispersed the crowds. The students' day was crowned, however, when the girl commando hijacker of a TWA plane to Damascus, Leila Khaled, addressed a student gathering of 2,000, speaking about her experience and expounding her viewpoints on commando activity and unity. Leila Khaled is a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Volunteers. Anti-commando students at AUB, mainly members of the Lebanese Student Union, were also active over the weekend. Like thousands in Lebanon, a large number of the students volunteered to join the army and placed themselves in the service of the Armed Forces. Press reports said volunteers from various parts of the Lebanon, who want to join the Armed Forces, numbered over 5,000. Many had to be refused because of lack of accommodation, the papers said.

Girl Commando. Addressing the students, Leila told the student audience that she refused to consider herself a heroin and said "I have given only what my duty demanded." She added, "I have given only very little of what I should have given. I will go on giving as long as I know that I have brothers and friends carrying arms against the Zionist enemy." She promised that she will confront Israel at any time...in the air, on sea and on land.

Concerning coordination between commando organizations especially in the field of battle, Leila said, "There is always coordination between commandos of different organizations in the field." She added that commandos helped each other with food, arms and ammunition. Any difference between commando organizations was political, she said.

Referring to the inconvenience that she might have caused to the TWA passengers during the hijacking, Leila said she wanted to write to all of them to apologize and to explain the Palestinian viewpoint.

IRAQ SAID IRKED BY STOP OF TRANSIT TRADE THROUGH SYRIA

Iraq

Beirut's AL HAYAT reported over the weekend that the Iraqi government has been irked by Syria's closure of the borders with Lebanon, causing a halt of transit trade between Beirut and a number of Arab countries, including Iraq. The paper said the Iraqi government, ruled by the Baath faction that is rival to that in Syria, has emphasized that the Arab countries are now in vital need of cooperation with each other, especially in matters that help boost Arab confrontation with Israel.

Weekend Main News and Trends, Cont'd.

Iraqi Viewpoint. According to the right-wing paper, the Iraqi government has already submitted its viewpoints to the Syrian government. The paper said Iraq has threatened to raise the issue at the Arab League Council. It noted that the countries now affected by the closure - Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf States - have signed the Arab League transit trade agreement.

According to AL HAYAT's report, around 250 trucks, packed with goods that are likely to be spoiled, are now lined along the Lebanese-Syrian highway, awaiting the opening of the borders. The paper said 150 Jordanian trucks coming from Amman had been turned away by the Syrian authorities, because they were carrying goods to Lebanon. Syria had said that it was ready to import or export any goods to the Arab states through its ports of Latakia and Tartous.

UAR, LIBYA, SUDAN TO HOLD MINI-SUMMIT IN DECEMBER

Inter-Arab

An Arab mini summit comprising the UAR, Libya, and Sudan, will be held next December, according to the authoritative AL AHRAM on Friday. The summit will concentrate on discussing "the best and most immediate needs to set up closer cooperation among the three countries," the paper said. It did not say where the proposed summit will be held.

Libyan Troops. Meanwhile, in another report, AL AHRAM said that Libya is to send troops to help in the Arab fight against Israel along the Suez Canal and in Jordan. The paper quoted the Libyan Defense Minister, Col. Adam Hawas, as saying the Libyan armed forces were being rebuilt for active combat and participation in the battle with Israel. He added that the country's new revolutionary government was putting all its economic, financial and human resources at the disposal of the Arab cause.

Colonel Hawas, who will lead Libya's delegation to the Arab League's joint Defense Council on November 8, said his delegation would call for military unity between the Arab armed forces. He said Libyan proposals will include a call for the revision of the League's Charter to make it a more effective body. They would also call for creation of a unified Arab military command and a Chief of Staff headquarters to supervise the training, arming and organizing of the Arab armed forces.

LEBANESE, BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES ISSUE STATEMENT

Communists

A joint statement issued by the Lebanese and Bulgarian communist parties in Sofia has associated the events in Lebanon with a U.S. imperialist plan aimed at isolating Lebanon from the rest of the Arab countries and changing this country into an economic, social, and political base for imperialism. The statement was issued at the end of a visit by the head of the banned Lebanese Communist Party, Nicola Shawi, to Bulgaria. The visit started on October 24. The statement expressed strong support of the Bulgarian Communist Party for the communist and progressives' struggle in Lebanon, according to Beirut's communist organ, AL NIDA, which published the full text of the joint communique.

The statement condemned: the imperialist aggression on the Arab states during June, 1967; Israel's refusal to abide by the Security Council resolutions, especially that of November 22, 1967; the U.S. statement pertaining to Lebanon's sovereignty and security issued recently by the State Department; the drive against progressives in Lebanon by the authorities. "

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BBC B

B24 IRAQI: REVOLUTION COUNCIL: TEN NEW MEMBERS NAMED

136

(IRAQ NEWS AGENCY) BAGHDAD: IT HAS BEEN LEARNED THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECENT AMENDMENT OF THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, THE NUMBER OF THE REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL MEMBERS IS NOW 15.

IN ADDITION TO THE ORIGINAL MEMBERS - PRESIDENT AL-BAKR, AFF GEN. SHIHAB, AND LT. GEN. GHAYDAN - THE COUNCIL NOW HAS 10 NEW MEMBERS FROM THE TWO PARTY COMMANDS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE PREPARATION FOR THE 17TH JULY REVOLUTION. THEY ARE:

SADDAM HUSAYN, TAHA AL-JAZRAWI, ABD AL-KARIM AL-SHAYKHLI, IZZAT AL-DURI, MURTADA AL-HADITHI, SALAH UMAR AL-ALI, SHAFIQ AL-KAMALI, ABDALLAH SALLUM AL-SAMARRAI, IZZAT MUSTAFA, AND ABD AL-KHALIQ AL-SAMARRAI.

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B24 NAMED 2:

IT HAS ALSO BEEN LEARNED THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SHAFIQ AL-KAMALI AND IZZAT MUSTAFA THE NEW COUNCIL MEMBERS ARE MEMBERS OF THE BAATH PARTY REGIONAL COMMAND. SHAFIQ AL-KAMALI IS AN IRAQI MEMBER OF THE PARTY'S NATIONAL COMMAND. IZZAT MUSTAFA WAS A REGIONAL COMMAND MEMBER WHEN THE REVOLUTION BROKE OUT.

IT WILL BE REMEMBERED THAT SADDAM HUSAYN, WHO IS DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE REGIONAL COMMAND, HAS BEEN ELECTED DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL.

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18/11

(37)

UAR 18.30 GMT: Abd al-Fattah Hilal on US Middle East policy (see ME/3231/A/5).
18.30 GMT ("We and the World"): (i) The forthcoming Rabat summit conference and US Middle East policy; (ii) Rockefeller's report to Nixon on Latin America.

NEO III
"Voice of the Arabs" (Cairo) 11.30 GMT: Salah as-Suwayfi on US Middle East policy (see ME/3231/A/5). 12.40 GMT ("People in Sinai"): Duty of Muslims to sacrifice and be steadfast. 14.15 GMT ("Palestine Service"): Adil al-Qadi on escalation of fida'i action. 16.20 GMT: Need for battle with enemy. 17.00 GMT: Yemeni talk by Shaykh Muhammad Abd al-Hadi al-Ujayl on message of Ramadan. 18.00 GMT: Muhammad Abu al-Futuh on Israeli participation in US Sixth Fleet manoeuvres.

Arab Radio Comment 15.11.69

IRAQ 19.00 GMT: Sending of delegation to Southern Yemen and Libya to agree on progressive method to fight imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

JORDAN 19.00 GMT: Dayan's collective punishment threat and the Arab people's steadfastness.

LEBANON 18.00 GMT: Red Cross anniversary.

LIBYA 12.30 GMT: British and US bases in Libya (see above).

MOROCCO 13.00 GMT: The Apollo 12 mission. 20.30 GMT: King Hasan II's Ramadan lectures.

SUDAN 12.30 GMT: Sudanese Peace Committee's statement on Vietnam.

SYRIA 12.15 GMT (repeated 19.15 GMT): Imperialist military co-operation with Israel.

"Voice of the Arabian Peninsula" (Damascus) 17.30 GMT: (i) Disagreements at Gulf Federation meetings; (ii) biography of named hero; (iii) series on imperialist and reactionary co-operation in Arabian Peninsula.

UAR 12.30 GMT: Muhammad Sharaf on Israeli participation in the US Sixth Fleet manoeuvres. 18.30 GMT ("From Week to Week"): Review of week's events including UAR naval attack on Sinai, Israeli participation in Sixth Fleet manoeuvres, Nasir's 6th November speech, Arab Defence Council's decision to hold Rabat summit conference, and Libyan cancellation of British air defence system and Libyanisation of banks.

"Voice of the Arabs" (Cairo) 11.30 GMT: Abd al-Fattah al-Adawi on UAR reply to US proposals on Middle East crisis. 12.40 GMT ("People in Sinai"): Life of the Prophet. 14.15 GMT ("Palestine Service"): Adil al-Qadi on recent fida'i operations including the Haifa refinery explosion. 16.20 GMT ("Conversation with a Listener"): Israeli repression in occupied territory and US support for Israel. 17.00 GMT ("Arabian Peninsula"): Muhammad ad-Dali on US support for Israel. 18.00 GMT: Muhammad Uruq on US support for Israel.

Arab Radio Comment 16.11.69

IRAQ 19.00 GMT: Iraqi delegation's visit to Libya.

JORDAN 19.00 GMT: The blowing up of houses in Halhul and Ramallah by the Israelis.

LIBYA 12.30 GMT: Numayri's visit and co-operation with Sudan.

SUDAN 12.30 GMT: Numayri's visit to Libya to unite Arab potential. 19.30: Numayri's visit to Libya as part of Sudan's efforts to co-operate with Libya and UAR against aggressors.

SYRIA 12.15 GMT (repeated 19.15 GMT): Need for Arab steadfastness in face of Zionist and imperialist expansion plots.

TUNISIA 12.00 GMT: Bahi al-Adgham's Government policy statement.

UAR 12.30 GMT: Fawzi Muhammad Surur on the USA as leading enemy of the Arabs.
18.30 GMT ("Spotlight on World Problems"): (i) US diplomatic and military support for Israel; (ii) aggressive nature of US policy in Vietnam and elsewhere.

"Voice of the Arabs" (Cairo) 11.30 GMT: Muhammad Abu al-Futuh on US support for Israel and hostility to Arabs. 14.15 GMT ("Palestine Service"): Adil al-Qadi on the firing on Arab crowds in Ramallah. 16.20 GMT ("Conversation with a Listener"): Arab nation as a living force on road to better future. 17.00 GMT ("Arabian Peninsula"): Sa'd Ghazal on statement by Kuwaiti Minister of Defence and Interior on force as only solution to Middle East crisis. 18.00 GMT: Sa'd Ghazal on recent UAR naval operations.

"Maghrib Service" (Cairo) 21.30 GMT: Praise by Samir Abd at-Tawwab for the Libyan rulers' new policy on the Arab cause.

Reports in Brief

UAR Cabinet meeting on 16th November (Text) The Cabinet met under President Abd an-Nasir at the Presidential Palace from 19.30 to 21.00 today. Afterwards, the Minister of National Guidance, Muhammad Faiq, issued the following statement: The Cabinet reviewed the political and military situation in the light of international contacts and developments. President Abd an-Nasir outlined the results of the talks held with the Sudanese Revolution Command Council Chairman, Maj-Gen. Jafar an-Numayri, and his delegation. The Cabinet then discussed a report by the Foreign Minister, Mahmud Riyadh, on the outcome of the Joint Arab Defence Council meeting and the situation regarding the forthcoming Arab summit conference in Rabat. The Cabinet also reviewed Mahmud Riyadh's report on US Middle East policy and continued US hostility to the Arab cause. (Cairo in Arabic 20.00 GMT 16.11.69)

Italian Socialist delegation's departure from Damascus The delegation of the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity led by Salvatore Corallo, member of the Party Central Committee, left Damascus on 16th November for Italy after a 10-day visit and talks with a Ba'th Party delegation led by Malik al-Amin National Command Member. (Damascus in Arabic 12.15 GMT 16.11.69)

Italian CP delegation's departure from Iraq The Italian Communist Party delegation left Iraq for home on 15th November. Shibli al-Aysami, Assistant Secretary-General of the Ba'th Party, was at the airport. (Baghdad in Arabic 11.30 GMT 15.11.69)

Iraqi delegation's return from Southern Yemen Salah Umar al-Ali, member of the Regional Command of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and member of the Revolution Command Council, and his delegation returned to Baghdad on 15th November after a three-day visit to the People's Republic of Southern Yemen. (Baghdad in Arabic 19.00 GMT 15.11.69)

Iraqi Revolution Command Council membership In accordance with the recent amendment of the provisional Constitution, the number of the Revolution Command Council members is now 15. The 10 new members are Saddam Husayn, Taha al-Jazrawi, Abd al-Karim ash-Shaykhli, Izzat ad-Duri, Murtada al-Hadithi, Salah Umar al-Ali, Shafiq al-Kamali, Abdullah Sallum as-Samarra'i, Izzat Mustafa and Abd al-Khaliq as-Samarra'i. With the exception of Shafiq al-Kamali and Izzat Mustafa, the new Council members are members of the Ba'th Party Regional Command. Shafiq al-Kamali is an Iraqi member of the Party's National Command. Izzat Mustafa was a Regional Command member when the revolution broke out. (Baghdad in Arabic 06.00 GMT 17.11.69)

this region's security should be taken by local powers,' he said. The Government's policy was concerned primarily with rapid economic and industrial expansion made possible through strong defence.

Abu Dhabi

ECONOMIC: Planning Arab Assistance Sought

Abu Dhabi's planning council decided on 8 October to ask Arab governments to provide experts to help in the development of the state, according to a report in the *Daily Star* of Beirut.

Bahrain

POLITICAL: Foreign Iran Boycotts Meeting

It was announced on 7 October that 'Iran had cabled the session of the Regional Bureau of the World Health Organisation now meeting in Alexandria, declaring its boycott of the session because of Bahrain's participation, on the basis that Iran still adheres to the fable that Bahrain is Iranian and not Arab', *Cairo Radio* reported the following day.

'The Arab delegates rejected the contents of the cable,' the radio said, and 'the Bahraini delegate declared that his country was an independent state and could not acknowledge the contents of the Iranian cable. The delegates of Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and the UAR spoke after that in support of Bahrain's independence.'

The Bahraini delegation to the conference (See *ARAB AFFAIRS*) was Dr. Ibrahim Yacoub of the Medical Services Department. Qatar was represented by its Deputy Director of Medical Services, Dr. Fuad Quwaini, and Public Health Officer Dr. Ahmed Ajeldin.

ECONOMIC: Tourism New Hotel Opened

A 130-room hotel, described as the most modern in the Gulf, was opened on 1 October. It has been built on reclaimed land in a residential district of Manama, the capital, and overlooks Qadabiya Bay. When the hotel was formally inaugurated by the Ruler on 29 September it was announced that two extension wings would be built, bringing the number of rooms to 255 by 1971.

Dubai

POLITICAL: Foreign Ruler Visits Iran

The Ruler of Dubai, Shaikh Rashid Ben Said al-Maktoum, left Tehran on 4 October after a four-day official visit to Iran at the invitation of Iranian Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida. His visit included talks with the Shah on relations between the two countries, Iranian policy in the Gulf, and Iranian relations with the Gulf States in general, it was reported.

ECONOMIC: Finance Commercial Bank Opens

The Commercial Bank of Dubai has opened for business, the Chase Manhattan Bank of the United States announced on 2 October.

Plans to form the Commercial Bank were announced in July 1969 by Chase Manhattan, the Commerzbank of West Germany and the Commercial Bank of Kuwait (ARR 279).

Oil & Gas BP-CFP-Hispanoil Deal

A major re-alignment of participants in Dubai's new oil wealth, involving British Petroleum (BP), the French state-controlled Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP) and the Spanish state oil company Hispanoil, was reported in the Paris daily *Le Monde* of 11 October.

BP, which had held a two-thirds stake in Dubai Marine Areas (DUMA) against CFP's one-third, has sold all its rights in DUMA to CFP for an undisclosed amount—a move that is understood to have taken place in September

or early October. CFP in turn has concluded a series of agreements with Hispanoil on production rights, oil supply and investment in the Spanish oil industry: these include selling Hispanoil half CFP's stake in DUMA. DUMA controls half Dubai's oil output, so CFP and Hispanoil now each control a quarter of the state's production.

DUMA has a 50 per cent interest in the Dubai Petroleum Company (DPC), which operates the Dubai concession. The rest of DPC is owned by Continental Oil of the United States, Texaco subsidiary Deutsche Erdol and Dubai Sun Oil.

Fateh Field Inaugurated

Dubai's first offshore oilfield, the Fateh field, was officially inaugurated by the Ruler, Shaikh Rashid Ben Said al-Maktoum, on 13 October, *Agence France Presse* reported.

Dubai's first oil shipment was made on 24 September. The state's production is expected to rise to 100,000 barrels a day in 1970 (See ARR 383).

Qatar

ECONOMIC: Trade East German Delegation

An East German delegation arrived in Qatar on 1 October from Kuwait, to hold talks with the Qatar Chamber of Commerce on strengthening trade, according to *East-West Trade News* on 2 October. The delegation left for Bahrain the following day.

Muscat & Oman

POLITICAL: Foreign Imam Ghalib on Tour

The Imam Ghalib Ben Ali of Oman was received in Cairo on 4 October by ASU Higher Executive Committee member Anwar al-Sadat and Committee member and National Assembly Speaker Dr. Mohammed Labib Shukeir, the *Egyptian Gazette* reported. The Imam's visit had started on 18 September as part of a tour of Arab countries, the paper said.

Baghdad Radio reported on 14 October the arrival of the Imam from Damascus that day. In a statement to the *Iraqi News Agency* the Imam said: 'We will acquaint our brothers in authority in Iraq with the development of the Omani people's struggle for freedom and independence. We will also exchange views with them on the measures the Arab states should take to support the Omani question . . .'. He proclaimed the Omani people's determination to fight the imperialists, saying 'Our people have adopted continuous popular struggle as the only means of achieving independence'.

The Imam Ghalib is not recognised by the ruling Sultan of Muscat & Oman, Saeed Ben Taimur, or by the British Government, which handles the Sultanate's foreign affairs.

IRAQ

POLITICAL: Internal

Talks with Communists Stalemated

Sidam Husain al-Takriti, described by the Beirut newsletter *Arab World* as 'the strong man behind the Iraqi Baath Party', has said that the Iraqi Government's talks with members of the Iraqi Communist Party had reached a 'stalemate'. In an interview with the Beirut weekly *Al-Sayyad* Takriti said the talks—part of a plan to form a national-front government—had broken down on three points: the question of the existence of Israel, Kurdish nationalism and joint efforts to begin political indoctrination 'immediately, and at the lowest level'.

Takriti said contacts with other 'progressive' parties had

almost stopped. He accused them of acting 'as if the regime were a spoil of war' and of 'always thinking of coups'.

There have long been fundamental differences between the Baath and the Communists, many of which concern interpretation of Marxist socialism. The Communists are, moreover, committed to the existence of an Israeli state, and to support of Kurdish nationalism as a legitimate revolutionary movement.

Bazzaz Reported Sentenced

The Kuwaiti daily *Al-Siassa* reported on 3 October that former Iraqi Prime Minister Abd-al-Rahman Bazzaz had been sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment by the Iraqi Revolutionary Tribunal, after a secret trial.

The report said that Fadl Mohammad Ali, a former colonel, had received a similar sentence.

Bazzaz, Prime Minister of Iraq between September 1965 and August 1966, was arrested in December 1968 (ARR 68/412) on charges of conspiring to overthrow the state. On 8 July this year the government announced that Bazzaz was to stand trial, and later that the proceedings would be televised.

Diplomatic Reshuffle Reported

The Cairo Middle East News Agency reported on 7 October that 'the largest reshuffle of Iraqi diplomats since the Baath Party came to power' had been taking place in Baghdad, some 106 diplomats being affected.

Trade Union Ban on Ministers

Under a decree promulgated on 14 October, no minister may be chairman of a trade union. 'All previous regulations inconsistent with this order' have been rescinded, the decree said.

'Assassination' Reported

The death of Major-General Muhammad Nuri Khalil—said to have been 'assassinated' on 3 October—was reported by *Ahwaz Radio* (Iranian) on 11 October. The broadcast said Khalil, the Commander of the Iraqi Army Fifth Division and later Commander-in-Chief of Iraqi forces on the Eastern Front, had disappeared in Baghdad after being recalled 'after a rumour of an attempt to overthrow the Baghdad regime'.

Districts Law Issued

A law reorganising Iraq into 16 districts (liwas)—one of which contains a Kurdish majority—was issued on 5 October.

The new legislation, put forward for public debate in August (ARR 319), is thought to represent a step towards decentralising the Iraqi government.

Kurdish War Losses

The Kurdish leader, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, said in a broadcast on 13 October that Kurdish losses in the 'war' with Iraqi forces were 20,000 killed or wounded, 3,000 villages destroyed, and more than 200,000 people made homeless. But Iraqi Defence Ministry statistics, Barzani said, showed that the cost to the Iraqi Government of this 'tyranny and oppression' was some ID 500 million.

Kurd Seeks UN Commission

Shafiq Qizaz, an Iraqi Kurd, asked the UN to send an international commission 'to mediate a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question' in a letter delivered to the Presi-

dent of the General Assembly, Mrs. Angie Brooks, on 9 October.

New Government Offensive Reported

The Cairo *Al-Ahram* reported on 9 October that the Iraqi Government had launched 'a new offensive' against Kurdish forces in the north some two weeks earlier.

Law on Kurdish Culture

A decree providing, among other things, for the introduction of Kurdish language teaching and text books in schools in northern Iraq, and for the establishment of a number of Kurdish journals and literary associations, was promulgated on 9 October.

Foreign Affairs Cairo Meeting 'Not a Summit'

The Deputy Premier and Minister of the Interior, Lieutenant-General Salih Mahdi Ammash, said in Beirut on 3 October that the recent Cairo conference of four Arab powers (ARR 374) could not be considered a substitute for an Arab summit conference, in spite of its success. Ammash was travelling to East Germany to attend its 20th anniversary celebrations.

Speaking of relations between Iraq and Lebanon, Ammash said he appreciated the efforts of those who had worked to dissipate the clouds which had led to tension between the two countries (see ARR 339). He hoped that every member of the Arab world would 'understand that Lebanon's role is to be found at the heart of the Arab world'.

Ammash Returns from East Germany

The Deputy Premier and Minister of the Interior, Lieutenant-General Salih Mahdi Ammash, returned to Baghdad on 14 October at the end of a 12-day visit to East Berlin to attend celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the founding of East Germany. Speaking shortly after his return, Ammash said 'the fabricated division of the German people' reminded him of the division of the Arab nation. He added that talks held with East German officials had been satisfactory, and that the East German Prime Minister, Willi Stoph, had accepted an invitation to visit Iraq.

Jordanian Appointed to Foreign Ministry

It was announced on 15 October that Dr. Abd-al-Karim Karasna, a Jordanian, had been appointed to a post at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. The Baghdad daily *Al-Thawra* said the appointment of Karasna was 'inspired by the Baath Party's view that 'each Arab country belongs to the entire Arab nation'.

Baath Group Accuses Government

In a statement from Damascus on 12 October a group called the Baath Party Command for the Iraq Region accused the government in Baghdad of carrying out a 'vicious war' against the Kurds, and of 'provoking inter-community strife in the south'.

Publication of the document in Damascus was seen by several observers in the Middle East as implying at least tacit approval of it by the Syrian Government and hence a new stage in the deterioration of relations between the two capitals.

The Lebanese Baath Party said in a statement on 12 October that some 400 Baathists 'and a large number of progressive nationalists' had been imprisoned in Iraq, and that 'large numbers' of them were dying every day. The statement added that the Iraqi Government was 'unalterably opposed' to the activities of the Palestine commandos.

ECONOMIC: Oil & Gas Oil Strike in Southeast

Drilling and preliminary testing have 'confirmed the presence of oil' in the Tayib area (southeastern Iraq), according to an announcement over *Baghdad Radio* on 2 October. The announcement said the discovery had been made by the French consortium ERAP, and that exploration would continue.

IRAQ Oil Production Million Long Tons

	Jan-Mar. 1968	Apr-Jun. 1969	Jul-Sept. 1969
Northern			
Iraq Petroleum	54.8	13.7	14.1
Mosul Petroleum	1.3	0.3	0.3
Southern			
Basrah Petroleum	16.5	4.2	4.1
	72.6	18.2	18.5

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As part of the imperialist-Zionist plan against the Palestine cause, the Rightist clique ruling in Iraq is plotting against fida'i action and the Palestine revolution by forming and supporting feeble and suspect organisations, closing Fatah and Sa'iqah offices in Baghdad, and prosecuting and killing their members. It is doing its best to establish groupings within fida'i organisations and is impudently siding with the capitalist regime in Lebanon against fida'i action...

Masses of our heroic people, workers, peasants, revolutionary intelligentsia and ideological soldiers, the Ba'th Party set off the Ramadan and March revolutions and believes that the toiling masses are the instrument and objective of its fight. The Ba'th Party has a long history of struggle and knows the truth about the Rightist clique, its conspiratorial role against the Arab revolutionary movement and its subservience to imperialism.

Based on this, the Ba'th Party calls on the masses in Iraq and their revolutionary and progressive forces to realise the gravity of the situation facing the popular fight, the serious challenge to the progressive forces, and the fate awaiting the liberation movement at the hands of this puppet clique.

The Party urges all progressives to rise to the occasion in defence of the people and their fight for liberation and a better future, and to unite themselves in a progressive front capable of facing the people's enemies - the enemies of the Arab unionist socialist revolution.

Death to the traitorous conspiratorial Rightist clique; greetings to all steadfast fighters in Iraqi prisons; let the progressive forces' will to achieve our people's objectives of unity, freedom and socialism remain strong.

Iraqi Commemoration of "the 18th November Setback"

Baghdad home service in Arabic 17.00 GMT 18.11.69

(i) Text of report of statement by President Bakr to 'Ath-Thawrah':

President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr of Iraq has called upon the Ba'th Party fighters to maintain the masses' enthusiasm and support for the revolution by maintaining close contact with the masses. He also called upon patriotic forces not to repeat the mistakes of 1959 and 1963 by allowing secondary differences to overshadow their crucial battle with imperialism and Zionism.

In a statement published today in 'Ath-Thawrah' on the 18th November setback, Bakr said: The Party fighter, who in the age of passive struggle managed to maintain close contact with the people and to carry out the revolution, must not today, after the success of the revolution, become the victim of self-delusion and arrogance and thus lose contact with the people, for the masses are the shield of the revolution. It is the masses who tell the fighters what to do. Also, the fighters have devoted their lives to the service of the people. The Party fighters must also avoid self-delusion and behave humbly in the hour of victory. The revolution daily offers victories for the people. It is only doing its duties towards the achievements of our great objectives. This is contrary to self-delusion.

President Bakr asked Party fighters not to be so engrossed in the daily government routine as to forget their duties to the people and their pains and problems. He said: Party fighters should stay sufficiently away from the Government so as to maintain their close contact with the masses and their requirements. Past setbacks have taught all parties and patriotic forces in the Arab world in general and Iraq in particular, the need to bury all grudges and passive attitudes and to find a common ground enabling all to continue to achieve victories for the people and to spare the nation of any possible further setbacks. Parties and patriotic forces in Iraq and everywhere in the Arab world are called upon not to repeat the mistakes of 1959 and 1963, when their secondary differences overshadowed the crucial struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

Speaking about the circumstances which led to the 18th November setback, the President said: The great Ramadan revolution made a series of mistakes. These mistakes were explained by the Party in the documents released by its congresses and commands. The Party criticised those mistakes and drew lessons from them. I am not revealing any secrets when I say that the fighters and honest leaders of the Party were the first to point out those mistakes and deviations and strongly to warn against their consequences on every occasion. They also made sincere and earnest efforts to correct those mistakes and deviations to save the revolution from further deterioration and to preserve the Party's reputation among the people. However, a cunning ill-intentioned group exploited the evolutions and Party mistakes and the revolutionaries' goodwill and word of honour and on 18th November revolted against the Party and the revolution, drowned the country in blood, made it live in the darkness of persecution, corruption and backwardness, hampered its progress, undermined its stability and instilled despair in the hearts of the citizens. Despite its mistakes, the Ramadan revolution was an awakening for the Arab nation after the secession catastrophe. The Ramadan revolution placed the nation on the course of unity, strength and progress. The people looked up to the revolution as the shield and spearhead in the battle to liberate Palestine.

The fighting President, who suffered most from the setback and endured its five base years with patience and courage, asked: What happened after the plotters had conspired against the Ramadan revolution? He replied: All unity projects ended and people merely paid lipservice to them. Also, the Arab armies had been united so they could enter the battle with the Zionist battle from a strong position. The revolutionary unionist current receded and was replaced by regionalism and isolationism. Thus, when war broke out on 5th June 1967, the Arab States and armies were defeated. Had there been a single united Arab stand and a single united Arab army the defeat would have been avoided. The November setback was not catastrophic to the Ba'th Party alone, for the Party is known for its courageous struggle. Its fighters do not mind if they are imprisoned, tortured or expelled. They endured that for five years with courage. They also endured that before the 14th Ramadan and the 14th July revolutions. But the November setback was catastrophic to the Arab nation, because it disrupted Arab unity and dealt a blow to one of the main Arab revolutionary forces which had sincerely fought against imperialism and Zionism.

The 5th June setback was history's punishment for those who hailed the 18th November setback and such other setbacks. Thank God the era of the setback is over. The Party has learned its lessons from the setback, rebuilt itself, and trained its machinery in shouldering the responsibilities - hence the 17th July revolution. What the 17th July revolution has achieved clearly serves as evidence to what the Ramadan revolution could have achieved six years ago had it not been for the bitter circumstances it went through and had the plot not taken place. Furthermore, the 17th July revolution achievements show how much Iraq and the Arab nation - particularly the Palestine question - have lost throughout the base years of the setback. Our victory on 17th and 30th July 1968 affirms that the people cannot be defeated and that the Ba'th Party - the Party of the toilers - will continue to be the flagbearer to achieve the Arab nation's objectives and that it is stronger than conspiracies, reaction and imperialism.

(ii) Text of report on demonstrations in Iraq:

The masses throughout the country today denounced the black November setback. Iraqi News Agency reporters in the provinces agree that the people staged demonstrations throughout Iraq stressing their support for the revolution Government, their eagerness to protect the progressive 17th July revolution's gains, and their denunciation of the 18th November renegade plot hatched by reactionary elements who betrayed the glorious 14th Ramadan revolution.

The INA correspondent in Ramadi Province says that Fallujah, which gave 17 martyrs on the morning of the evil setback, put its lights out this evening for five minutes to mourn its martyrs who had fallen victims to treason and treachery.

INA correspondents say speeches made during tumultuous demonstrations throughout the country by representatives of Ba'th Party organisations and popular and vocational organisations hailed the July revolutionaries and their loyalty to the Arab nation and its fateful issues.

Arab Radio Comment 18.11.69

IRAQ 19.00 GMT: Anniversary of 14th Ramadan revolution (8th February 1963).

JORDAN 19.00 GMT: Jordan's preparation for the battle.

LEBANON 18.00 GMT: Turning of Palestinian people from refugees into a resistance front.

LIBYA 12.30 GMT: Importance of inter-Arab visits and talks.

SYRIA 12.15 GMT: Atasi's visit to Poland.

UAR 12.30 GMT: Sa'd Abu as-Su'ud on the high price being paid by Israel for occupation of Arab soil. 18.30 GMT ("Spotlight on World Problems"): (i) Misleading nature of Western propaganda on Middle East conflict; (ii) false US claims about wanting a peaceful solution in the Middle East.

"Voice of the Arabs" (Cairo) 11.30 GMT: Muhammad Abu al-Futuh on Israeli policy and escalation of Arab Resistance. 12.40 GMT ("People in Sinai"): Parallel between injustice suffered by the Prophet and that suffered by Arabs under Israeli occupation. 14.15 GMT ("Palestine Service"): Last week's developments, including negotiations in Israel to form new coalition and opposition to Golda Meir. 16.20 GMT ("Conversation with a Listener"): Israeli plans concerning the Aqsa mosque. 17.00 GMT ("Arabian Peninsula"): Samir Abd at-Tawwab on importance of joint Arab efforts and the Arab summit conference. 18.00 GMT: Abd al-Rattah al-Adawi on recent UAR military operations.

"Maghrib Service" (Cairo) 21.30 GMT: Ismat Ibrahim on recent events as refutation of Israeli and imperialist belief about Arab weakness.

Reports in Brief

UAR National Assembly meeting The National Assembly met on 18th November under the Chairmanship of Dr. Muhammad Labib Shuqayr (Cairo in Arabic 21.00 GMT 18.11.69). After hearing a report by Mahmud Riyad, the Foreign Minister, the Assembly issued a report stating that it believed that the UAR had made every effort to support the attempts for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, that the USA was responsible for the failure of these attempts and that Israel would not have been able to defy the UN if it had not been for US support. The Assembly noted its appreciation of Soviet and socialist support and now awaited the Arab summit conference (Cairo in Arabic 23.30 GMT 18.11.69).

Iraqi delegations to Poland and Yugoslavia A workers' delegation led by Fawzi Faraman, organisation secretary of the workers' Trade Union Federation has left for Warsaw at the invitation of the Polish Workers' Union (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 10.05 GMT 18.11.69). A delegation led by Shibli al-Aysami the Ba'th Party Assistant Secretary General, left Baghdad for Yugoslavia on 18th November. During its 10-day stay, the delegation will get acquainted with Yugoslavia's socialist experiment (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 10.06 GMT 18.11.69).

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Mr M. Johnson 20/11
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BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

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15 November 1969

(1/3)

Dear Peter,

Acquittal of Iraqis Charged with Spying for
Iran and Israel

Please refer to my letter 1/3 of 8 November. The Lebanese Ambassador told H.M. Ambassador recently that in his view the announcement of this court decision had no connexion with the Iraq/Iran rapprochement. It was simply that the accused were almost to a man Shais, and their release was intended to butter up the Shia leaders in preparation for the millenary celebrations at Kerbela. It had been one of several steps taken to ensure that the celebrations were not a flop.

2. I report this theory for what it is worth. It seems to me that it is not necessarily an alternative to the idea that the acquittals were intended to improve the atmosphere in Iraq's relations with Iran, since a more cordial relationship between the Government and the Shias would in itself contribute to an easing of the tension with Iran.

Yours sincerely

Mike

(M. K. Jenner)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

Copies to: M. C. S. Weston, Esq.,
Tehran

P. Joy, Esq.,
Beirut.

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Near Eastern
Dept.,

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD.

8 November 1969



Iraq and the Lebanese Crisis

It may be useful at this stage to consider Iraq's attitude to and rôle in the Lebanese crisis which has dominated the political scene here since it began over two weeks ago.

2. The immediate reaction in Iraq was predictably to exploit the situation as a propaganda opportunity. The government-controlled information media denounced the Zionist/Imperialist forces which had allegedly engineered the crisis, through the "ruling clique" in Lebanon, in order to split the Arab movement. On 22 October a large demonstration in protest against their action marched to the Lebanese Embassy and succeeded in invading the grounds and replacing the Lebanese flag with the Palestinian flag (some reports have it that the Lebanese flag was burnt). President Bakr came out publicly in support of the fedayeen and pledged the Iraqi army to their support. Such an opportunist attitude clearly could not ease the situation and could do much harm by giving extremist muslim elements in Lebanon the sort of moral support which they needed.

3. However one week later General Ammash had left Baghdad for what turned out to be a round tour of Cairo, Tripoli, Beirut and Amman, with a brief to help efforts to reach a solution. Little is known of what happened at these meetings but reports from Cairo and Beirut indicate that Ammash was able to make a useful contribution; he made two trips to Cairo where he met President Nasser, General Bustani and fedayeen leaders and later in Lebanon he was received twice by President Helou. Following his return to Baghdad the press has not been slow to hail his achievement in "defusing the Lebanese crisis," and from Lebanon both the Mufti and the National Action Movement have addressed telegrams to President Bakr thanking him for "an effective contribution to the rescue of Lebanon." In fact Iraq's contribution was probably useful, not so much in the field of mediation, since this was already under way in Cairo when Ammash started his tour, but in that Iraq's decision to support efforts towards a solution possibly swayed radical Arab opinion and led to the effective isolation of Syria as the one country concerned to foment trouble in Lebanon.

4. Iraq's immediate reaction to the crisis was predictable. She has never had anything to fear from the rising power of the fedayeen outside Iraq and has always supported their activities

/in other

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

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in other Arab countries while keeping them (such as they are) under firm control in Iraq itself. Moreover the régime has never had much sympathy for what it likes to represent as the puppet régime in Lebanon and naturally seized this opportunity to attack them and their "Imperialist/Zionist backers." A more responsible attitude supervened with the growing realization that this crisis was more serious than the previous ones and had more than local implications. Officially Iraq's intervention was prompted by the need to preserve the unity of the Arab forces in the face of Israel. However it is likely that Syria's rôle in the crisis, as it emerged more clearly, played a crucial part in the Iraqi decision to intervene. Despite a limited degree of military co-operation in recent months, ideological differences between the Ba'ath in Syria and Iraq still predominate and relations between the two are cool. Iraq could not be expected to tolerate Syria's interference in the Lebanon which might even be seen as an attempt by Syria to realize the dream of a "greater Syria."

5. All this has implications for Iraq's future rôle in Arab affairs. She may now hope to be seen in the eyes of other Arabs as playing a constructive part in Arab affairs which, while it still clearly cannot rival the position of President Nasser, may earn credit for her in the newly emerging radical Arab states, in particular Libya and the Sudan. The Iraqi Ba'ath's claim to leadership of the Arab world from the Atlantic to the Gulf, however fanciful, would thus be significantly less unrealistic than it was six months ago.

overstated!

Yours sincerely
M. K. Jenner

(M. K. Jenner)

c.c.

Chancery,
BEIRUT
AMMAN
CAIRO
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BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

(141)

(1/3)



17 November 1969

Iraq's Constitution

Please refer to my letter 1/3 of 15 November. The Press of 17 November prints the names of the fifteen members of the recently expanded Revolutionary Command Council. I list their names in the order in which they are given:-

*President Bakr, Chairman (LP No. 37)

Saddam Hussein, Vice-Chairman

*General Saleh Mehdi Amash (Minister of Interior, LP No. 125)

*General Hardan Abdul Ghafer Tikriti (Minister of Defence,
L.P. No. 63)

*General Hamad Shehab (Chief of General Staff, L.P. No. 61)

*General Sa'adun Ghaidan (Baghdad Garrison Commander, L.P.No.119)

Abdul Karim A l-Sheikhly (Minister of Foreign Affairs, L.P.No.11)

Abdullah Salloum Al-Samarkha'i (Minister of Information,
L.P.No. 30)

Dr. Izzat Mustafa (Minister of Health, L.P.No. 74)

Shafiq al Kamali (Minister of Youth, L.P.No. 127)

Abdul Khaleq Al-Samarra 'i

Saleh Omar Al-Ali

Izzat Al-Doori

Mustadha Al-Hadithi

Taha al Jazra'i

(* member of the original R.C.C.)

The Baghdad Observer remarks that all except Shafiq Al-Kamali and Izzat Mustafa are members of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath party; Sayid Kamali is an Iraqi member of the National Command and Izzat Mustafa was a member of the Regional Command at the time of the revolution.

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near East Department,
F.C.O.

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2. I hope to send you biographical notes on those new members not included in our current personalities list as soon as possible, with more detailed comments on the composition of the new R.C.C. For the moment however, it does not seem that anyone of importance in the Party has been omitted and thus the composition of the new R.C.C. does not indicate any shift in the balance of power. The confusion over the position of Generals Tikriti and Ammash is slowly being resolved. They are now clearly seen to rank below Saddam Hussein and are now no longer described in the press and the official Iraqi News Agency as Deputy Prime Ministers (see paragraph 5 of my letter under reference).

Jim Munn

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(M. K. Jenner) /

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
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A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAEL

President Bakr on Ba'th Party's Role in Iraq

Baghdad home service 11.30 GMT 20.11.69

Excerpts from speech by President Bakr at inauguration of Dawwayah irrigation on 20th November (broadcast from a recording):

Citizens, you are well aware of the era of backwardness which the country has been through because of the lack of consciousness on the part of those leaders who were once in control of the people's affairs... The era of nepotism, favouritism, racialism, communalism and regionalism has gone for good. It has been replaced by an era of work, planning and sustained effort. We are all aware of our individual responsibilities and therefore those who neglect their duties and undermine our efforts will be brought to account without mercy [cheers and applause].

Citizens, the reason for our interest in and care for comprehensive agricultural development stems from our interest in the Iraqi peasant, who for many years was fettered, humiliated and robbed of his rights. It is also a part of our planned policy of fighting imperialism and its lackeys in order to plug all the loopholes through which imperialism infiltrated in an attempt to harm a large section of the people...

You all know, brothers, that your Party, the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party [applause], ruled Iraq following the great 1963 Ramadan Revolution, which demanded much effort and sacrifice. However, after nine months we lost that revolution, a loss for the country and for the Arab nation... There were a number of reasons for this loss, but the two most important reasons were as follows. The first was the agreement among the Party's enemies - enemies of the Arab nation - both in and outside the country to wipe out the Party because they really felt that it represented a serious danger to their interests. The second reason was that Party officials committed mistakes, many of which were exaggerated. Some of the mentally ill people among them behaved dishonestly and were tempted by their love of ostentatious appearances and selfishness. Thus the Party became divided, which enabled those lying in wait for the Party and the Arab nation to implement their criminal plan...

I proudly say: Long live those efficient men who so skilfully laid the Party's foundation the day it was established. We and the Arab nation wish to thank them and express our great appreciation [applause]...

We shall never forget the help of our friends in the socialist world and the various forms of assistance they gave us. The imperialists, their agents, Zionism and the enemies of the Party and the nation did not like what we planned and executed. They began to throw spanners in the works, to plot and to offer generous military assistance, forgetting that the revolution was this time stronger than ever before and capable of crushing all their plots.

For this reason, I say that the 17th July revolution - the revolution of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and of the Arab nation - is proceeding on the path laid down by its sons, unafraid of all the plots against it and resolutely determined to regain the rights of the working masses and to stand with the Arab countries seeking to improve the welfare of the Arab masses...

Let all fainthearted people realise that the noble Iraqi people are well aware of those who care for their interests and will therefore no longer be deceived by misleading statements and propaganda...

Noble Iraqi people, you must rest assured that the socialist Arab Ba'th Party is the ruling party in Iraq. It is the leading party. It has appeared for your sake and to achieve its aims, which are the aims of the Arab nation, and its aspirations for unity, freedom and socialism [applause]. The Party opens its arms and heart to receive all the sincere and (?efficient) people who want to co-operate with it in shouldering the burden of responsibility and of national action for the sake of the masses. Everyone should know that our motto for our work is: Justice, fairness, loyalty, sustained work and unremitting efforts for the nation's progress...

Beirut Statement on the Nabatiyah Affair

Beirut home service in Arabic 14.00 GMT 20.11.69

Text of report:

A military spokesman has made the following statement: At 09.30 today four armed men in a private car stopped at the post and telegraph office at Nabatiyah. One of them, brandishing his machine-gun and equipped with grenades, approached the head of the post office. The armed man asked in a threatening tone why the telephone service between the office and Nabatiyah[refugee] camp had been interrupted. The head of the post office replied that this was due to a technical fault which he hoped would be repaired today. The armed man insulted him and threatened to use force. The incident, which took place in front of female telephone operators, caused alarm. When the citizens of Nabatiyah heard about the incident, they resented such behaviour.

When the four armed men returned to the camp, the Nabatiyah military barracks commandant contacted those responsible in the camp and issued a strongly-worded warning that strict measures would be taken if instructions forbidding persons to leave the camp armed and in camouflage uniform were not complied with. The commandant received no reply but was met with threats. Subsequently at 11.00, about 100 armed men attacked an army post there with machine-guns. Supporting forces intervened to prevent the armed men from occupying the post. An exchange of fire ensued. As a result, six of the military were wounded, one of them seriously. Nine armed men were wounded, three of them seriously.

The military spokesman expressed regret at the incident, particularly since efforts were still being made day and night to ensure implementation of the Cairo agreement by those responsible on both sides. The spokesman said in conclusion: It seems that a number of people are being incited to carry arms as a challenge, in order to disturb the atmosphere and bring back chaos to undermine implementation of the Cairo agreement.

Israeli Suppression of "Terrorist" Groups

(a) Israel in Arabic 09.12 GMT 20.11.69

Text of report:

An Israeli Defence Forces spokesman has announced that a few days ago the Navy captured a boat carrying a number of saboteurs and explosives. The saboteurs intended to land in the coastal area north of the country. Those arrested included a number of people who had left the country earlier.

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A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAEL

President Bakr on Ba'th Party's Role in Iraq

Baghdad home service 11.30 GMT 20.11.69

Excerpts from speech by President Bakr at inauguration of Dawwayah irrigation on 20th November (broadcast from a recording):

Citizens, you are well aware of the era of backwardness which the country has been through because of the lack of consciousness on the part of those leaders who were once in control of the people's affairs... The era of nepotism, favouritism, racialism, communalism and regionalism has gone for good. It has been replaced by an era of work, planning and sustained effort. We are all aware of our individual responsibilities and therefore those who neglect their duties and undermine our efforts will be brought to account without mercy [cheers and applause].

Citizens, the reason for our interest in and care for comprehensive agricultural development stems from our interest in the Iraqi peasant, who for many years was fettered, humiliated and robbed of his rights. It is also a part of our planned policy of fighting imperialism and its lackeys in order to plug all the loopholes through which imperialism infiltrated in an attempt to harm a large section of the people...

You all know, brothers, that your Party, the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party [applause], ruled Iraq following the great 1963 Ramadan Revolution, which demanded much effort and sacrifice. However, after nine months we lost that revolution, a loss for the country and for the Arab nation... There were a number of reasons for this loss, but the two most important reasons were as follows. The first was the agreement among the Party's enemies - enemies of the Arab nation - both in and outside the country to wipe out the Party because they really felt that it represented a serious danger to their interests. The second reason was that Party officials committed mistakes, many of which were exaggerated. Some of the mentally ill people among them behaved dishonestly and were tempted by their love of ostentatious appearances and selfishness. Thus the Party became divided, which enabled those lying in wait for the Party and the Arab nation to implement their criminal plan...

I proudly say: Long live those efficient men who so skilfully laid the Party's foundation the day it was established. We and the Arab nation wish to thank them and express our great appreciation [applause]...

We shall never forget the help of our friends in the socialist world and the various forms of assistance they gave us. The imperialists, their agents, Zionism and the enemies of the Party and the nation did not like what we planned and executed. They began to throw spanners in the works, to plot and to offer generous military assistance, forgetting that the revolution was this time stronger than ever before and capable of crushing all their plots.

For this reason, I say that the 17th July revolution - the revolution of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and of the Arab nation - is proceeding on the path laid down by its sons, unafraid of all the plots against it and resolutely determined to regain the rights of the working masses and to stand with the Arab countries seeking to improve the welfare of the Arab masses...

Let all fainthearted people realise that the noble Iraqi people are well aware of those who care for their interests and will therefore no longer be deceived by misleading statements and propaganda...

(143)

REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY SEEN CHANGING ITS
POSITION IN FAVOR OF COMMANDO ACTIONCommunists,
Commandos

Is the Iraqi Communist Party changing its attitude on the Palestinian commando movement? This was the question posed by Beirut's pro-UAR and pro-Iraq weekly AL SAYYAD yesterday when it reproduced a report said to have appeared in the clandestine organ of the Iraqi Communist Party, TARIK AL SHAAB (Road of the People) saying that a party delegation had visited the front-lines in Jordan and held talks with Palestinian commando leaders.

The Report. The report, according to AL SAYYAD, said that the invitation to the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) had been made by the principal Palestinian commando organization, Al Fatah. The ICP delegation, said the report, inspected the Palestinian Arab resistance movement "and held talks with the commando heroes who are resisting the Zionist invasion and fighting for the purification of the occupied Arab land."

During its stay in Jordan, the report said, the delegation held "important talks" with the leaders of Al Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, another commando organization that is active against Israel, as well as with other commando organizations and progressive parties. The talks dealt with various aspects of the armed struggle, its horizons and requirements, the report said.

AL SAYYAD noted that it was for the first time the ICP's organ mentioned that the delegation had expressed "its full support and complete backing for the legitimate armed struggle that is being launched by the Arab people against the Zionist invaders and imperialists."

The Beirut weekly said that the political circles which are following up the attitude of the ICP have begun wondering if such a reference to the ICP delegation's visit to the commandos meant a fundamental change in the attitude of the party on the subject of guerrilla action by the Palestinians. It recalled that the ICP, which is Moscow-oriented (in contrast with the dissident communist faction self-styled the Central Leadership), had been accused of opposing the Palestinian commando movement and supporting, instead, a political settlement for the Palestine case, and the Middle East crisis in general. This line of policy has been the declared policy of Moscow since the U.N. Security Council resolution for peace in the region was adopted on November 22nd, 1967, about five months after the Arab-Israeli war.

Beirut's weekly wondered if such a move by the Iraqi Communist Party (such as visiting the commandos and playing up the story by the ICP's organ) would mean the prelude to a total rejection of the political solution to the Palestine problem in the same way as other leftist and progressive forces in the Arab world have done.

It will be recalled that one of the main criticisms levelled against the ICP's Central Committee by the dissident communist faction, Central Leadership, was that the pro-Moscow faction had deviated from the teachings of Marxism-Leninism by considering the Palestinians, fight against Israel as something different from the Arab fight against imperialism. The Iraqi dissident group rapped the Soviet Union for recognizing the state of Israel 21 years ago, and for withholding support to the Palestinian commandos so far.

Communists and Kurds. In another report, TARIK AL SHAAB launched a strong campaign against "those who are trying to exploit the situation in Northern Iraq to serve the interests of imperialism and Zionism." The paper did not specifically point out who it meant by that, but the Beirut weekly AL SAYYAD took it as a reference to the "alliance of the U.S., Iraq, Barzani". This is also the first public reference to the ICP's opposition to disturbances in Northern Iraq where Mullah Mustafa Barzani has been leading the Kurdish insurgent movement against the Baghdad government in support of the Kurds' demand for autonomy. The paper said that increasing pressure was being exerted on the ruling Arab Baath Party government in Baghdad "by exploiting the conditions in the North and forcing the government to change its anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist policy." It will be recalled that Mr. Sidam Takriti, believed to be the dynamo of the ruling Baath Party, had said that one of the obstacles in way of establishing a national front with the ICP was the fact that some communists in the North were fighting the government on the side of Barzani. TARIK AL SHAAB's reference to the situation in the North may be a "good will" move to pacify the Baath Party.

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1/3



CONFIDENTIAL



(145)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD.

29 November 1969

*Reg 2 & Bu. 16 Dec.
to PRMH
✓ noted JM 5/12*

Dear Peter,

Iraq's Constitution

Further to my letter 1/3 of 17 November, I now enclose biographical notes on those members of the expanded Revolutionary Command Council not included in our Leading Personalities Report. These are designed to be used, if you wish, as addenda to the present Personalities Report; the necessary amendments will be made to the entries in the present List as part of the revision which we now have under way.

2. The only further comments I have to add to my letter under reference are that Generals Ammash and Hardan Tikriti are now again described as Deputy Prime Ministers after a week or so when they were called simply Ministers of the Interior and Defence respectively. This strengthens our belief that the constitutional changes were not intended to mark any diminution in the status of the two men; dropping their title of Deputy Prime Minister may however have been interpreted as such (although it was a logical step following the abolition of the Prime Minister's post) and was therefore abandoned after a short time. Secondly, although we do not possess a complete list of the members of the Regional Command of the Party, it would certainly appear that not all have been elected to the Revolutionary Command Council.

Yours sincerely

(M. K. Jenner)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

CONFIDENTIAL

15A

ABDUL KHALEQ AL SAMARRA'I

Born 1933, a teacher from Samarra. A member of the Regional and National Commands of the Ba'ath Party. Appointed a member of the Revolutionary Command Council November 1969. A hard-liner, one of the more extreme members of the Ba'ath Party who last year was pressing hard for a popular front with the Communists. In late 1969 assumed a particular responsibility for Kurdish Affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

73A

IZZAT AL-DOORI

Born 1934, a teacher from Ana. July to December 1968 a member of the Baghdad Committee of the Regional Command, later (date unknown) elected a reserve and then permanent member of the Regional Command. Elected a member of the Revolutionary Command Council November 1969; Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council's Public Affairs Bureau and member of the "Follow-up Bureau". Reputedly a left-wing idealist of peasant stock, friendly with Abdullah Salloum Al-Samarra'i (q.v.). Emerged in late 1969 as the regimes front man in the agricultural /agrarian reform push.

Al-Doori has light skin and red hair and is described by Europeans as recalling "a British Army Sgt/Major of the old school".

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108A

MURTADHA AL-HADITHI

Born 1932, a teacher from Haditha. Member of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party from August 1968; elected to the Revolutionary Command Council November 1969. A member of the Revolutionary Command Council's "Follow-up Bureau". Since 1968 closely linked with Saddam Hussein who supported his re-election to the Regional Command of the Party in December 1968. ~~As~~ a member of a Party Committee studying the general economic situation he cooperated closely with the Party's Economic Bureau and INOC.

Like his prominent relatives Anwar al-Hadithi (q.v.)
and NASSER AL HADITHI
/ (ex Mutassarif of Basrah and now Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo) he is well disposed towards IPC. Visited London in late 1969 for an operation on his nose.

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122A

SALAH OMAR AL-ALI

Born 1933, a teacher from Tikrit. A member of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party, appointed a member of the Revolutionary Command Council November 1969. Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council's "Follow-up Bureau", he also sits on the Party Committee (which at one time he chaired) supervising the activities of the Arab Liberation Front. Headed an Iraqi delegation to South Yemen in November 1969. Reported to be one of those opposing a settlement with IPC November 1969. Since the revolution of July 1968 he has been closely linked with Saddam Hussein and Murtadha al-Hadithi (q.v.).

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135A

TAHA JAZRAWI (major)

Born 1935. Possibly a Ba'athi appointee to the Army in 1968. A member of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party elected to the Revolutionary Command Council November 1969; Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council's Arab Affairs Bureau and Central Committee of Investigation. He is largely concerned with military matters. For some time before the July 1968 revolution he had been a member of the Ba'ath Party's Military Affairs Bureau, this post he still holds. In mid/late 1968 appointed Chairman of the Officers Posting Board (in this post he would be concerned with Ba'ath party infiltration of the armed services). Visited Bulgaria in September 1969 where he had talks with the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Appointed Assistant Secretary to the Chief of General Staff October 1969.

A sinister and unpopular figure.



Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear] 26/10

then [unclear]

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS


OF

THE CHANCERY

[Signature]

14/11

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BEIRUT.



CONFIDENTIAL

British Embassy,



BAGHDAD.

26 November, 1969.

(1/3)

Dear Peter,

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, on his return from London, received me for an hour on the evening of 20 November. He spoke warmly of the medical treatment he had received in England, seemed in good heart (despite rumours that he has lost a bit of standing as a result of the recent constitutional changes here), and was helpful over a number of minor points. The relaxed affability of senior Ba'athist figures, when one succeeds in seeing them, is a feature of the local scene so curious as to be almost disturbing.

2. In the course of our discussion I told Shaikhly that I found the constantly unfriendly tone of the daily papers in Baghdad difficult to stomach. They seemed determined to represent the policies and actions of H.M.G. in the worst possible light while paying fulsome and uncritical attention to Soviet Bloc affairs, in a manner which hardly seemed to reflect the Iraqi Government's non-aligned position. Shaikhly eventually suggested that, whenever I was displeased with a newspaper article, I should send an official Embassy correction or statement to the editor concerned with a copy to himself. The editors always consulted him on receipt of communications of this kind, and he gave them appropriate instructions. I thanked him, adding that I would not make use of this kind offer every time I found a press article distasteful, if only because this would entail an increase in the Embassy clerical staff.

3. It is of course difficult, because of the balancing-act to which we are committed, to present British policy on the key Middle East issue without exposing a flank; but where it is a question of a bald factual error, e.g. the recent canard about joint naval manoeuvres with Israel, I will make what use I can of Shaikhly's offer. The reason I report it is simply to ask for as early as possible transmission of denials on occasions such as the one cited above. On the occasion concerned we had to wait five days, by which time even the Baghdad editorialists were losing interest in the subject.

4. Perhaps more helpfully, Shaikhly himself observed that, regardless of what the press published or did not publish, it was important that I should keep him, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed whenever I thought British policy or actions were misunderstood. I said that I would gladly take him up on this, adding that I hoped

.../it

J. P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

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- 2 -

it would prove easier to obtain audience with him through his Protocol Department than I was finding it to secure appointments (through the same inescapable channel) with some of his Ministerial colleagues, whom I naturally was anxious to meet.

Long am

Spencer

(H. G. Balfour Paul)

c.c. Chanceries at:

Cairo
Jeddah
Bahrain
Beirut
Tel Aviv
Amman
Kuwait
Washington

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 8 DEC 1969 15 November 1969	Embassy, BAGHDAD. RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 20 NOV 1969 NEQ 1/2
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Iraq's Constitution

I enclose the text of the third amendment to the Interim Constitution which we reported and commented on briefly in our telegram no. 943 of 11 November.

2. At this stage some attempt at an analysis of the changes and their implications must be made, but the situation is far from clear and assessments vary enormously and often contradict each other. The Baghdad Observer chose to headline the news "A Presidential system of government" thus giving the impression that President Bakr's personal position was materially strengthened by the changes. The headline (which is a quotation from the Preamble to the amendment) is correct in that the transfer of the powers of the Prime Minister, a post now abolished, to the President and his acquisition from the Revolutionary Command Council (R.C.C.) of the power to appoint Ministers strengthens the constitutional position of the President. However, as Bakr was previously both President and Prime Minister, the power he personally holds is not now significantly greater than before. His power, now as before, rests on his position in the Party, of which he was on the same day unequivocally described as being Secretary General, and on his personal standing and alliances with others in their positions.

3. The Preamble is therefore in accord with the facts when it explains the changes in the President's constitutional powers as a recognition of the situation which has existed in practice since the régime has been in office. Similarly there is much truth in the statement that the inclusion of members of the Ba'ath Party's Regional and National Command in the expanded R.C.C. is no more than an acknowledgement of the rôle they have played in governing the country since the Ba'athi revolution. The Ba'athi principle of group leadership has thus received constitutional endorsement and party spokesmen make much of this. Indeed, there is speculation which may be well founded that the inspiration for the formal changes to permit the interlocking of Party and Government at the highest level came from Michel Aflaq, the Party's founder and chief ideologist, who has been in Baghdad for some weeks.

4. Although it is certainly true that the admission of the Party leadership into the expanded R.C.C. reflects the real location of collegiate power in the régime, it is quite possible that it will lead to changes in the balance of power at the top of the college.

.../Some

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

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Some have seen in this a move to weaken the military non-party members of the original R.C.C. - Generals Hardan Tikriti, Hammad Shehab and Saadoun Ghaidan - one or all of whom could now be constitutionally voted out of the Council by the overwhelming civilian majority (And this of course would accord with original Ba'athist preaching that, once revolution is accomplished, the soldiers should return to their barracks). Quite to the contrary, other sources see in it a ruse to allay the fears and suspicions of the party rank and file who have been worried by Hardan's moves to strengthen his influence; these sources' interpretation is that the amendment is a smoke-screen designed jointly by President Bakr, Hardan Tikriti and Saddam Hussein who will prove when the smoke blows away to be firmly entrenched as a triumvirate.

5. The true significance will not emerge until it has become clearer what realignment, if any, has taken place at the top. On paper Saddam Hussein as the new Vice Chairman of the R.C.C. and deputy to the President would seem to have established himself as dauphin over the heads of Generals Tikriti and Ammash. Certainly Saddan (on whom, since he is not in our Personalities list, a brief note is enclosed) has now emerged from the twilight, has his face and his name on the front papers of the newspapers every day, and has since the announcement taken public precedence over the two Generals. The latter, however, are still prominent and ostensibly at ease and are still described as deputies to a Prime Minister who no longer constitutionally exists. There is more fuel for speculation in Article 7 of the amendment which speaks of "Vice-Presidents" of the Republic. There is no longer any traceable provision in the constitution for making such appointments but it is evidently intended that there should be some. Who then will have these posts? Will it be Ammash and Tikriti? The question was not answered by the last meeting of the Council of Ministers which was chaired, as usual, by General Ammash as Deputy Prime Minister when according to the amended constitution it should have been chaired by a vice-President.

6. Perhaps we shall in time see that little if anything has changed and that the main effect of the changes has been to put the leading figures in the régime in a position where they are seen to be exercising power, and enjoying its fruits, openly instead of behind the scenes. (In that case one assumes that the identity of the Party members who have been added to the R.C.C. will be progressively disclosed. So far only two have been named, and then obliquely). In conclusion, it is some comfort that soviet bloc diplomats were quite clearly as non-plussed by the

.../announcement

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- 3 -

announcement as the rest of us.

Yours sincerely

M. K. Jenner

(M. K. Jenner)

(without first enclosure)

c.c./ Chanceries at:

Beirut
Cairo
Amman
Kuwait
Jeddah
Washington
Bahrain Residency



SADDAM HUSSEIN AL-TAKRITI

Born about 1937. First came into prominence when chosen by the Ba'ath Party leadership in 1959 to assassinate Kassem and wounded in the attempt. Provisional Secretary General of the Regional Ba'ath Command after November 1963. Established himself thereafter as leading Party theorist in the background, emerging progressively into the limelight in 1969. Headed Iraqi delegation to Libya immediately after the Libyan revolution. Appointed Vice Chairman of the R.C.C. and deputy to the President November 1969, when he was also confirmed as Deputy Secretary General of the Iraqi Ba'ath.

A presentable young man. Initially regarded as a Party extremist, but responsibility may mellow him. Nephew of Khairallah Talfah, the Muhafiz of Baghdad and thus related to President Bakr by marriage. Connected, as a Tikriti, with many of those in the corridors of power.

British Embassy,

BAGHDAD.

15 November, 1969

THIRD AMENDMENT OF THE
INTERIM CONSTITUTION

Baghdad, 9th November - IFA.

The Revolutionary Command Council introduced the third amendment to the Interim Constitution for the expansion of the Revolutionary Command Council by accepting members who participated in 17 July Revolution whether by planning or implementing it in recognition of their work side by side with the official members of the council. The amendment also aimed at making out of the system of Government Presidential in conformity with our country's conditions at the current phase. Hereunder is the text of the amendment:

In the Name of the People
the Revolutionary Command
Council

In accordance with the provisions of Article No. 92 of the Interim Constitution, and in compliance with what was submitted by Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, we decided introducing the third amendment to the Interim Constitution:

Article No. (1) - Omitting Para (1), Article 42 of the Interim Constitution.

Article No. (2) - Omitting Para (1), Article 43 of the Interim Constitution and replacing it by:
Article 43 Para (1) the Revolutionary Command Council may dismiss one of its members by a two-third majority of its

Cont'd...

original members and may accept new members by a two-third majority of its members provided that the council members do not exceed 15 in number.

Article No. (3) -

Para (D) shall be added to Article No. 43.

Para D: The Revolutionary Command Council shall elect from among its members a Deputy Chairman to undertake prerogatives of Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and the President of the Republic during his absence.

Article No. (4) -

A- Omitting Para (4) from Article No. 44.

B- Omitting the term (the resolutions of Council of Ministers) from Para 5 Article 44.

Article No. (5) - Omitting Article No. (50) from the Interim Constitution and replacing it by Article No. 50 - The President of the Republic is head of State, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and head of government and shall exercise the following prerogatives:

A- Appointing the Ministers, accepting their resignations and relieving them of their posts. The Ministers shall be held responsible before him whether in fulfilling their tasks or in behaviour.

- B- Ratifying international pacts and agreements, laws and regulations.
- C- Appointing officials, relieving, discharging and pensioning them off according to law.
- D- Appointing officers and pensioning them off according to law.
- E- Appointing judges, magistrates and political representatives and pensioning them off according to law.
- F- Accepting credentials of representatives of foreign states, international and diplomatic corps in the Republic of Iraq.
- G- Declaring a state of emergency and ending it in cases mentioned in the law.

Article No. (6) -

Deleting Article No. (60) of the Interim Constitution.

Article No. (7) -

Deleting Article No. (61) of the Interim Constitution and replacing it by Article No. 61. The President of the Republic shall exercise the powers of government assisted by the Council of Ministers. The government is the executive and administrative power and is made up of the President of the Republic, Vice-Presidents and the Ministers. The President may entrust one of his Vice-Presidents with the chairmanship of Council of Ministers.

Article No. (8) -

The term "Prime Minister" shall be omitted from Article 66.

Article No. (9) -

Article No. 62 of the Interim Constitution shall be cancelled and replaced by: Article No. 62 - During their terms of office, the Vice-Presidents and the Ministers shall not undertake a free occupation or business nor purchase or lease any state properties.

Article No. (10) -

Article No. 71 of the Interim Constitution shall be cancelled.

Article No. (11) -

Article No. 95 shall be cancelled and replaced by: Article 95 - This amendment of the Interim Constitution is issued by the President of the Republic and considered effective from date of issuance in the Official Gazette.

Written at Baghdad on 9th Nov. 1969 coinciding with
28 Shaban 1388 Hijri.

Signed

the Revolutionary Command Council

PREAMBLE

It was found that the principle of collective leadership requires the expansion of the Revolutionary Command Council by including members who have taken part in the Revolution, planned and implemented it and...

for its consolidation and in view of the fact that the leading elements to be included in the Council are still undertaking leading tasks in it their membership in the Council was therefore considered an appreciation and a recognition of their work since the eruption of 17 July Revolution up till now. It was also found that since the issuance of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of Iraq on 21 Sept. 1968, the President of the Republic has acted as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and is still so and though the Interim Constitution does not contradict this yet it has been considered essential to confirm that in the provisions of the constitution. Besides, the events and the imperialist and Zionist challenges encountering Iraq and the Arab nation makes it essential to confront them with resoluteness and a strong hand capable of running the state affairs, fulfilling the revolutionary tasks successfully and defeating the enemies, by making the system of rule Presidential in conformity with our country's conditions under the current phase.

DT/Yk.



NE
148



CONFIDENTIAL

First Impressions of Iraq

SUMMARY

1. Absence of landmarks, literal and metaphorical, in Baghdad. (Paragraph 1).
2. Ba'athist mechanics of power. Anonymity and inaccessibility. (Paragraphs 2 and 3).
3. Despite unpopularity at home and abroad, internal cohesion has kept the Ba'athist régime in power (paragraphs 4 and 5) and will probably continue to do so (paragraph 6).
4. Implications of this for British interests. (Paragraph 7).
5. Is the régime as awful (and as far gone to Moscow) as all that? (Paragraph 8).
6. Moderately redeeming factors, especially for us. (Paragraph 9).
7. Recommendations for nourishing our "frozen assets", which may otherwise melt away. (Paragraphs 10 and 11).

CONFIDENTIAL

6 December 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

(3/1)

Sir,

In the enormous village which is Baghdad there are few landmarks, literal or metaphorical. The identity of its streets (as of other nameless alignments) is often a matter for guesswork. Even the River Tigris, which bisects Baghdad and may serve as a central symbol, suffers from too many introversions to be a reliable datum for newcomers. And one head of mission, who recently installed a magnetic compass in his motor car as a means of finding his way about, abandoned the attempt, he tells me, because the needle never seemed to point steadily northwards. It kept swinging round (owing perhaps to the quantity of metal stored there) towards the inconspicuous block housing Ba'ath Party Headquarters. If therefore my first impressions of Iraq, which I have the honour to submit in this despatch, lack clarity and orientation, I can only quote the gloomy assurance given to me by diplomatic colleagues of some years' standing that the scene becomes increasingly confused the longer they remain here.

2. The first task, I suppose, of a head of mission in any off-beat country is to discover where power lies and how to get at it. In present-day Iraq neither part of the question is /simple.

The Right Honourable
Michael Stewart, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.,

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simple. (One envies the cuneiform chroniclers of Babylonia their simple formula when faced with similar uncertainties. "Who is king? who is not king?" they chiselled blandly onto their tablets and washed their hands of the matter.) Whoever rules Iraq rules - perhaps this has always been the case - by intimidation. The present régime, at least until last month, has also ruled by anonymity. Officials, ministers, even the constitutionally supreme Revolutionary Command Council - all the ostensible, and ostensibly non-Party, organs of government - were compelled by an open secret to defer even on trivial issues to the dictates of the Ba'ath Party's Regional Command whose membership, apart from President Bakr and one or two non-stop public performers, was strictly anonymous. Power, in grossly concentrated form, thus lay with a small group of known figures, inaccessible from overwork, and a larger number of unknown ones, inaccessible by definition. In a formal sense this situation was altered by the amendment to the Constitution announced on the 9th of November. But the merger of the Regional Command and the old Revolutionary Council into a single, supreme, Ba'athist government organ of fifteen named members may not unfortunately make for greater accessibility.

3. This for three reasons. Firstly, only the few who hold executive office are obliged to give audience at all; and the President himself, whose genius for manipulation (if for nothing else) makes him much more than a figurehead, is the most aloof

/Head

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Head of State in Iraqi history. Secondly, requests for audience with holders of any office whatsoever have to be addressed to the Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a roomful of affable but incompetent young place-men who sit, when present at all, waist-deep in telephone receivers, most of them (if one's own experience is anything to judge by) either disconnected or tapped or both. Protocol Department's period of gestation is elephantine and is no doubt meant to be. Even my Indonesian colleague, whose standards of comparison in this respect must be fairly accommodating, describes it as "the most god-awful protocol organisation he has even come across". Finally, to complete the diplomat's frustration, whereas even Qassem in his day could be buttonholed continually at cocktail parties, Ba'athist leaders do their drinking in private.

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5. Recent history, however, suggests that the reef on which Iraqi governments founder is not unpopularity at home or abroad but lack of internal cohesion. Has this régime then, now nearly eighteen months old, a degree of internal cohesion so unexpected as to have caught history off its balance? Is the Party held powerfully together by a common determination to pursue against all odds its founder's impressive (if imprecise) ideals? Or is it nothing but a caucus of ruthless power-seekers inspired only by the lively knowledge that if they do not hang together they will hang separately? Green idealism or blue funk? I believe

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7. If then we are stuck with this régime, how much does it matter? Does its general policy threaten any of our major interests? Oil of course comes first. This is not the place (nor the time, since talks have just begun) to argue the pros and cons of a settlement of the Iraq Petroleum Company's dispute with Iraq on "unfavourable" terms. My own perhaps parochial pleadings are on record elsewhere. All I would observe here is that, whatever difficulties the Iraqis are laying up for themselves if no settlement is reached (and North Rumaila is finally lost to us, progressive nationalisation

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8. It may be argued that it is heading in that direction quite happily under its own momentum, and that a deal with the I.P.C. would effect only a momentary pause. So bald a statement needs more detailed scrutiny; and I shall shortly be submitting an assessment of the position which bloc penetration has so far reached. But is this member of the Arab family, as I assumed before I came here, quite so black (or red) a sheep? Iraq is by nature more violent in its impulsiveness than other Arab countries: the impulses themselves are much the same. This régime, like others in the aftermath of foreign tutelage, is primarily concerned to prove its manhood. Because revolutionary Iraq has made a series of bad starts, its sense of urgency is exceptionally acute. Its ideas, indeed its achievements, in various fields of development may be bitty and uncoordinated (as well as uncongenial to ourselves) but they are not contemptible. Nor does it lack competent

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9. So much is obvious and undeniable. But is it the whole truth? Must we regard Iraq as a lost cause? I am not yet wholly persuaded. In the first place, the primary concern of the Iraqi Government is, as I have said, to be its own master; and unless I am wholly gullible, the Soviet bloc finds it not much easier to handle (again despite appearances) than we do. Secondly, the present régime, however cohesive, is not homogeneous. Its dominant figures quite certainly do not want their links with the West to atrophy, whatever absurdities of behaviour the régime as a whole may be led into by its congenital suspiciousness. Thirdly, what this country needs more than all else is stability. A stable if /unattractive

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11. In this despatch, however, I seek only to record the existence, as a frozen asset, of this special Iraqi relationship with Britain. If we let this frozen asset lie untouched too long, we shall find when we finally open the refrigerator (if so mixed a metaphor may be allowed) that the electric wiring has rotted away and there is nothing there but mouse-droppings.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Aden, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Paris, Washington and Moscow, the Political Resident, Bahrain, the United Kingdom Delegation to N.A.T.O. and the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant

W. S. Baqir

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Required.

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PH.

Copies sent to posts as listed
in para 12.

2. Spare copy circulated to:
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S. P. S.

Planning Staff

1/ London very much

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IRAQ
12 December, 1969
Section 1

IRAQ: FIRST IMPRESSIONS

Mr. Balfour-Paul to Mr. Stewart. (Received 12 December)

SUMMARY

Absence of landmarks, literal and metaphorical, in Baghdad (paragraph 1).

2. Ba'athist mechanics of power. Anonymity and inaccessibility (paragraphs 2-3).

3. Despite unpopularity at home and abroad, internal cohesion has kept the Ba'athist régime in power (paragraphs 4-5) and will probably continue to do so (paragraph 6).

4. Implications of this for British interests (paragraph 7).

5. Is the régime as awful (and as far gone to Moscow) as all that? (paragraph 8).

6. Moderately redeeming factors, especially for us (paragraph 9).

7. Recommendations for nourishing our "frozen assets", which may otherwise melt away (paragraphs 10-11).

(Confidential)

Baghdad,
Sir, 6 December, 1969.

In the enormous village which is Baghdad there are few landmarks, literal or metaphorical. The identity of its streets (as of other nameless alignments) is often a matter for guesswork. Even the River Tigris, which bisects Baghdad and may serve as a central symbol, suffers from too many introversions to be a reliable datum for newcomers. And one Head of Mission, who recently installed a magnetic compass in his motor car as a means of finding his way about, abandoned the attempt, he tells me, because the needle never seemed to point steadily northwards. It kept swinging round (owing perhaps to the quantity of metal stored there) towards the inconspicuous block housing Ba'ath Party Headquarters. If therefore my first impressions of Iraq, which

I have the honour to submit in this despatch, lack clarity and orientation, I can only quote the gloomy assurance given to me by diplomatic colleagues of some years' standing that the scene becomes increasingly confused the longer they remain here.

2. The first task, I suppose, of a Head of Mission in any off-beat country is to discover where power lies and how to get at it. In present-day Iraq neither part of the question is simple. (One envies the cuneiform chroniclers of Babylonia their simple formula when faced with similar uncertainties. "Who is king? Who is not king?" they chiselled blandly on to their tablets and washed their hands of the matter.) Whoever rules Iraq rules—perhaps this has always been the case—by intimidation. The present régime, at least until last

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month, has also ruled by anonymity. Officials, Ministers, even the constitutionally supreme Revolutionary Command Council—all the ostensible, and ostensibly non-party, organs of Government—were compelled by an open secret to defer even on trivial issues to the dictates of the Ba'ath Party's Regional Command whose membership, apart from President Bakr and one or two non-stop public performers, was strictly anonymous. Power, in grossly concentrated form, thus lay with a small group of known figures, inaccessible from overwork, and a larger number of unknown ones, inaccessible by definition. In a formal sense this situation was altered by the amendment to the Constitution announced on the 9th of November. But the merger of the Regional Command and the old Revolutionary Council into a single, supreme, Ba'athist Government organ of 15 named members may not unfortunately make for greater accessibility.

3. This for three reasons. Firstly, only the few who hold executive office are obliged to give audience at all; and the President himself, whose genius for manipulation (if for nothing else) makes him much more than a figurehead, is the most aloof Head of State in Iraqi history. Secondly, requests for audience with holders of any office whatsoever have to be addressed to the Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a roomful of affable but incompetent young place-men who sit, when present at all, waist-deep in telephone receivers, most of them (if one's own experience is anything to judge by) either disconnected or tapped or both. Protocol Department's period of gestation is elephantine and is no doubt meant to be. Even my Indonesian colleague, whose standards of comparison in this respect must be fairly accommodating, describes it as "the most god-awful protocol organisation he has ever come across". Finally, to complete the diplomat's frustration, whereas even Qassem in his day could be buttonholed continually at cocktail parties, Ba'athist leaders do their drinking in private.

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I have, &c.

H. G. BALFOUR-PAUL.



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'Spy' awaits 3 death

By our own Reporter

The date for the execution of the first Iraqi to be convicted of spying for Britain by the Ba'athist regime is still uncertain.

Iraqi friends of the convicted man, Zaki Abdul Wahab, said in London yesterday that he was innocent. They said he had been tortured and forced to appear on television to confess his guilt.

Mr Wahab was the director-general of Rafideen bank — the government bank—before the Ba'athist coup in July, 1968.

Mr Wahab was arrested during the round up of former political figures earlier this year. Three former Prime Ministers and a dozen Cabinet Ministers were charged with working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr Wahab was originally charged with spying for Britain, but later it was alleged he was also engaged in CIA activities.

The trials have been interpreted as an attempt by the regime to destroy all possible opposition.

Friends of Mr Wahab pointed out yesterday that from the time he resigned from the National Democratic Party in 1958 he had refused to get involved in politics.

Miss Collyer JAC 11/12
News Cont.

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All we have on Mr Wahab is at

Flag D. Reference to spying & Britain is
at Flag H. - this type of accusation
has been flung around fairly haphazardly
at the time of the earlier trials in January / February.

PMH Humble 10/10

Michel Aflaq in Baghdad Comrade Michel Aflaq, Secretary General of the National Command of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, arrived in Baghdad last night. He was accompanied by Comrade Niquila al-Farzali, member of the Party National Command. The founder-leader and his companion were given a warm welcome at Baghdad airport. Among those who received him were Comrades Shibli al-Aysami, Assistant Secretary General of the National Command, and Saddam Husayn, Deputy Chairman of the Revolution Command Council. (Baghdad in Arabic 04.15 GMT 17.12.69)

Death of Iraqi Ba'thist in Turkey The body of Jamil as-Sayyid Na'im al-Hilali, Ba'th Party member and Secretary of the Arab students' organisation in Turkey, arrived at Baghdad airport on 10th December from Turkey. At the airport the body was received by Muhammad Sulayman, member of the Ba'th Party National Command and Salah al-Ali and Izzat ad-Duri, members of the Regional Command. Hilali died on 12th December as a result of gas poisoning. (Baghdad in Arabic 04.15 GMT 17.12.69)

Explosion in Zahrani area (Text) A big explosion occurred at midnight last night in the Zahrani area. The explosion was heard in Sidon and nearby areas. It has been reported that the explosion occurred when a TAPline pipeline near the sea in the Zahrani area was blown up without a fire breaking out. (Damascus in Arabic 17.30 GMT 17.12.69)

Atasi's meeting with Kamal Junblatt (Excerpts) Chief of State and Premier Dr. Nur ad-Din al-Atasi this afternoon [17.12.69] received the Lebanese Minister of the Interior Kamal Junblatt in the presence of the Defence Minister Air Marshal Hafiz al-Asad, the Minister of the Interior Muhammad Rabah at-Tawil, and the Ba'th Party Politburo member Dr. Hadithi Murad. Earlier, Junblatt met the Minister of the Interior... Junblatt left Damascus for Beirut this evening. (Damascus in Arabic 19.15 GMT 17.12.69)

Damascus agricultural co-operatives conference At the opening of the first agricultural co-operatives conference in Damascus, a speech was made by Muhammad Sa'id Talib, the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. Delegations are participating from the Soviet Union, Poland, Bulgaria, North Korea, Eastern Germany, FAO, ILO, Pakistan, Hungary, the UAR, Iraq, Libya, Southern Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan and Algeria. (Damascus in Arabic 07.45 GMT 17.12.69)

Syrian sentences on "spies" for Iran On 17th December the Supreme State Security Court in Damascus found three defendants guilty of passing information about Syria to Iran. Muhammad Kamal al-Agha, a Palestinian, was sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour; Mohammad an-No'aymi, an Iranian, to 10 years hard labour and Muhammad Bin Muhammad al-Khatib to five years hard labour. (Damascus in Arabic 12.15 GMT 17.12.69)

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Asifah operations (Abstract of Palestine Armed Struggle Command communiques dated 17th December) 1406/Asifah 1200: On 16th December fighters from the special group blew up the labour office at the Jabaliyah refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. 1407/Asifah 1201: On 16th December Group 128 inflicted damage and casualties in the area west of Allenby bridge. Group 112 inflicted damage and casualties in Umm Nakhlah. 1408/Asifah 1202: On 15th and 16th December snipers killed six soldiers in the northern valley. 1409/Asifah 1203: On 16th December Group 23 inflicted damage and casualties north of Khatib and destroyed a gun near Araqah. Group 16 wiped out an ambush in the Ghawr Abdullah area. ('Voice of Fatah' in Arabic 18.30 GMT 17.12.69)

'Voice of Fatah' programmes 17.12.69 The 'Voice of Fatah' programme in Arabic at 18.30 GMT on 17th December said that Israel was in economic difficulties, warned about Israeli 'traps', attacked the US plan to the Middle East and said that Israel had failed to arouse world sympathy. The programme in Hebrew at 19.20 GMT denounced Israeli tricks and said that the Arabs did not wish to annihilate the Jews but to eliminate the 'Zionist gang'.

Arab Radio Comment 17.12.69

JORDAN 19.00 GMT: Israeli 'atrocities' in occupied areas.

LIBYA 13.00 GMT: Libyan delegation's line at Rabat cummit.

MOROCCO 20.30 GMT: Success of UN General Assembly debate on the Palestine question and need for Arab summit to counter likely increase in Israeli aggression.

SAUDI ARABIA 18.00 GMT: The cost to Southern Yemen of the attack on Wadi'ah (see above).

SYRIA 12.15 GMT (repeated 19.15 GMT): The benefits to the country's economy of the agricultural co-operative movement.

TUNISIA 12.00 GMT: Importance to the national economy of hard currency from foreign trade.

UAR 12.30 GMT: Abd al-Fattah Hilal on the Libyan revolution's success in ending foreign presence in Libya (see above). 18.30 ('We and the World'): (i) Britain and USA's forced withdrawal from Libya and likelihood of similar withdrawal by Israel from Arab territory in future; (ii) comparison between Khartoum summit as one of 'steadfastness' and forthcoming Rabat summit as one of 'liberation'.

'Voice of the Arabs' (Cairo) 11.30 GMT: Salah as-Suwayfi on victory for Arab cause of the Libyan revolution. 14.15 GMT ('Palestine Service'): Expansion of fida'i operations and Israel's campaign of 'collective terror'. 15.15 GMT ('People in Sinai'): Mrs. Golda Meir's Knesset speech as a reflection of Israel's growing setbacks. 16.20 GMT ('Conversation with a Listener'): Israeli attempts to infiltrate Malta. 17.00 GMT ('Arabian Peninsula'): Significance of King Faysal's visit to Cairo.

'Maghrib Service' (Cairo) 21.30 GMT: Libyan revolution's victory over foreign bases.

Reports in Brief

Nasir's meeting with Tikriti (Text) President Jamal Abd an-Nasir this evening [17.12.69] received the Iraqi Deputy Premier and Defence Minister Lt. Gen. Hardan at-Tikriti, the Foreign Minister Abd al-Karim ash-Shaykhli and the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo. The UAR War Minister General Muhammad Fawzi attended the meeting (Cairo in Arabic 21.00 GMT 17.12.69). The Iraqi delegation to the Rabat summit is led by the Deputy Premier because the condition of President Bakr's health does not permit him to attend (Baghdad in Arabic 11.30 GMT 17.12.69).

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NOTE

Brigadier General Mahomet Abbas Twaij, lately Director of Medical Supplies, Iraqi Army, called to see me on 16 December. He told me that he had been placed on the Retired List from 1 November so he was more free now to devote his time to the interests of Glaxo and other firms who he has been representing in Iraq on a part-time basis while he was a serving officer. His prime purpose in visiting England was to see Glaxo and to confirm his latest British franchise with Langdown Scientific Co Ltd, whose Penlon products he is now promoting in Iraq. He said he would like me to look out for suitable firms in the pharmaceutical, fine chemical and anaesthesiology fields which he might add to his list of franchisees. He was particularly anxious that no great publicity should be given to this request and I assured him that we would proceed with discretion. Speaking very guardedly, he painted rather a sad picture of affairs in Baghdad at the moment, and I picked up the following pieces of interesting information:-

1. Hajj Mohdi Juma'a has been displaced as Director of Medical Supplies at the Ministry of Health. The new Director is Sa'ad Sa'ad Din who is a member of the ruling Ba'ath party. Juma'a has been demoted to a Pharmaceutical Inspector but in his chagrin he is applying to be released on pension. This explains why Juma'a's arrival as a Business Visitor was postponed and we now know that he will not be coming at all.
2. There is a new Director General of Kowadia, Khassan Al Rawi. The previous Director, Fagri Al Sirri, has become the Iraqi representative for Hoechst. The new DG represented Hungarian pharmaceutical interests before his appointment and is said to be strongly oriented towards East Europe and that this is now showing in his policies and purchases.
3. Brigadier Twaij's place as Director of Medical Supplies for the Army has been taken by Colonel Abdul Mallum who has been chosen more for his seniority than knowledge and apparently this has given rise to much ill-feeling in the Iraqi Medical Corps. (I have met Col. Mallum when he was second in command of Nassar Al Rashid Hospital and I thought him reasonably well-informed but more on instruments than on drugs.)
4. Brigadier General Khafaf, the impressive Director of Army Contracts, has now been promoted to Major-General and returned to his old Corps as Commander of the Iraqi Army Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. His successor as Director of Contracts is Brigadier General Ismail Sha'ad.

Brigadier Twaij said that, with discretion, it would be quite in order to communicate with him through his business address - Farabi Scientific Centre, P.O.B 3142, Bakshi Building, Jinnahriya Street, Baghdad. He said that, unfortunately, it would be unwise for him to contact the British Embassy in Baghdad but if he had any emergency enquiries about British medical supplies he would find a way of asking Mr Hawley to pass a message to me. He hoped to be in Britain rather more frequently in future. He very much wanted to be registered as a pharmacist in Britain and he gave me details of his academic training and qualifications and I promised to enquire whether he could be registered as a Member of the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain.

S M Davies

CYPHER/CAT A

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PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 1032

18 DECEMBER 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

152

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 1C 22 DEC 1969 NEH/1 NEH/1

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 1,032 OF 18 DECEMBER RFI
TO PARIS THE HAGUE WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.
IPC AND IRAQ.

I WAS TODAY RECEIVED BY SADDAM HUSSAIN, THE BA ATH PARTY'S
GREY EMINENCE AND RECENTLY APPOINTED VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL. THE CONVERSATION TURNED LARGELY
ON THE PRESENT REGIME'S ATTITUDE TO THE SOVIET BLOC AND THE
CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IPC DELEGATION (WITH WHOM I HAD
DISCUSSED TACTICS IN ADVANCE).

2. ON RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC SADDAM WAS AT
PAINS TO DISABUSE ME OF ANY IDEA THAT IRAQI BA ATHISTS WERE
SYMPATHETICALLY INCLINED TOWARDS COMMUNISM. HE INSISTED THAT
THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S LONG TERM AIMS
AND HAD NO INTENTION OF THROWING IN THEIR LOT WITH THE
EASTERN BLOC OR OF TURNING THEIR BACK ON THE WEST- BUT I MUST,
HE SAID, ACCEPT THE IMPLICATIONS IN THIS CONTEXT OF BOTH
PAST AND PRESENT ATTITUDES OF WEST AND EAST RESPECTIVELY
TO THE PALESTINE PROBLEM.

3. AS FOR IPC AFFAIRS (WHICH HE RAISED SPONTANEOUSLY AS
THE SECOND PRINCIPAL FIELD IN WHICH BRITAIN SHOULD ADOPT
A MORE HELPFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE IF ANGLO/IRAQI
RELATIONS WERE TO ACHIEVE THE DEGREE OF WARMTH WHICH HE
HIMSELF WOULD WELCOME) SADDAM MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS
FULLY ABREAST OF THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY. HE WAS QUOTE
NOT YET PERSUADED UNQUOTE HE SAID, THAT THE PROPOSAL

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/ADVANCED

ADVANCED BY THE DELEGATION INVOLVED² CONCESSIONS OF SUBSTANCE, AS DISTINCT FROM FORM, TO IRAQ'S REQUIREMENTS. I SAID THAT, THOUGH I HAD NEITHER STANDING NOR DETAILED KNOWLEDGE TO SPEAK ON THE COMPANY'S BEHALF, I SINCERELY BELIEVED THAT THEIR CURRENT PROPOSALS REPRESENTED UNRIVALLED MATERIAL ADVANTAGES FOR IRAQ AS WELL AS A SINCERE ATTEMPT TO SATISFY POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES. SADDAM REPLIED THAT THE IPC HAD CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE PAST TO IRAQ'S PROGRESS (IN THE COMPANY'S OWN INTERESTS, OF COURSE)- BUT ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS WHEN A SETTLEMENT WAS UNDER DISCUSSION IRAQI EXPERTS HAD EXPRESSED DOUBTS WHETHER THE COMPANY'S PROPOSALS WERE AS ADVANTAGEOUS TO IRAQ AS OTHER POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION- AND HE IMPLIED THAT THIS WAS ALSO THE SITUATION ON THIS OCCASION. MOREOVER, MANY PEOPLE IN IRAQ REGARDED THE IPC AS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AND SOME OF THE ODIUM ATTACHING TO THE LATTER IN THE CONTEXT OF PALESTINE INEVITABLY RUBBED OFF ON THE COMPANY- THEY CONSEQUENTLY TENDED TO REGARD PROPOSALS FROM THE IPC WITH SUSPICION. THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT THEREFORE COME TO TERMS WITH THE IPC UNLESS THEY WERE CONVINCED, AND COULD CONVINCE THE PEOPLE, THAT THE COMPANY'S PROPOSALS DID INDEED INVOLVE SUBSTANCE AS WELL AS FORM AND WOULD PROVIDE A BETTER SOLUTION TO IRAQ'S NEEDS THAN ANY OTHER POLICY OPEN TO THEM.

4. SADDAM THEN REVERTED TO RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC AND SADDAM REPEATED HIS EARLIER ASSURANCES. IRAQ HAD NO INTENTION OF LEAPING FROM FRYING PAN TO FIRE. THE CONVERSATION ENDED WITH MY RE-AFFIRMING MY PERSONAL CONVICTION THAT THE IPC WAS SINCERELY ANXIOUS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT AND THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD BE /EXTREMELY

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BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 1032 TO F.C.O.

- 3 -

EXTREMELY UNWISE, IN VIEW OF ALL THAT WAS INVOLVED NOT
TO RECOGNISE THE ADVANTAGES OF RESPONDING FAVOURABLY.

5. MY IMPRESSION OF SADDAM, WHO FEW OUTSIDERS HAVE
YET MET, WAS UNEXPECTEDLY FAVOURABLE- AND HIS SINCERITY,
AT LEAST, STRUCK ME AS BEYOND QUESTION.

6. ENSOR AND SUTCLIFFE ASK THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
ABOVE (WHICH THEY CONSIDER REASONABLY ENCOURAGING) BE
PASSED TO DALLEY.

7. FULLER REPORT BY BAG.

FCO PASS TO PARIS THE HAGUE WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

12/11/11
29/11

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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NEWS DEPT.

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RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

22 DEC 1969

NEQ 111

With the compliments of S. M. DAVIES

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY

14, Russell Square,
London, W.C.1.

Tel. No. 01-636-6811
Ext.....


Date.....

Jag.

Reg & p.a.

gm
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BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

20 December 1969

153

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Peter,

Saddam Hussain

Call M 21/12 An interesting account
I have marked the copy
to Mr Ellingworth.
in Hinchelliff
Enter 29/12

My telegram No. 1032 (on the IPC series) summarised part of the conversation I had with Saddam Hussain on 18 December. In it I said I would be reporting further by bag.

2. Since Saddam's emergence into the limelight last month as Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and recognised heir-apparent of President Bakr, I have naturally wanted to get at him - not least since the Soviet Charge told me that he at any rate had succeeded in doing so and had found him a "fanatical Ba'athist" without the four-square peasant sincerity of for instance Izzat al-Douri. This seemed encouraging.

3. After no more than a fortnight's prodding in Protocol Department (which is pretty good by local standards for audience even with lesser lights) an appointment came through. My main object was simply to form a first-hand impression of this previously inaccessible Grey Eminence and ascertain, if I could, his personal attitude (which some believe to have decisive weight) on major issues; but since the appointment came up at an interesting stage in the IPC delegation's second visit here, and since IPC affairs were bound to crop up in our conversation (as they unfortunately do in all conversations with leading Iraqis), I discussed with Sutcliffe and Ensor the previous night how far I should associate myself, as it were, with their activities.

4. Saddam's initial demeanour, when he received me (alone) in his modest office in the Presidential Palace, was singularly reserved - perhaps because the species was unfamiliar to him. Indeed, he said nothing at all for about five minutes, fixing me with an impassive stare while I spoke. I told him I was grateful for the opportunity of clearing my mind about one or two aspects of his Government's policy. My impression, I said, was that the present régime had now established itself firmly and confidently in power; and it seemed legitimate to assume that after eighteen months' experience the main lines of their policy would have taken definitive shape. On this assumption, it would help me to present to my Government an

/accurate

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

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accurate picture of Ba'athist thinking if I could have a description of it from the horse's mouth (not the expression I used). In the first place, I was anxious to know how he viewed Iraq's position in the East/West context. Judged by public postures and publicity media, his Government seemed to be veering far over towards the Soviet bloc. Did this represent their real sympathies or their understanding of where their country's interests lay? According to my reading of the published works, Ba'athist social philosophy was in fact much closer to the social philosophy of my own Government (istaghfar Allah) than to that of the Communist world; but his Government seemed bent on giving the opposite impression. I knew of course that the Soviet handling of the Palestine problem had a bearing on the Iraqi Government's attitude to the bloc. I needed no reminding of this and would be glad to take it as read. It was on other issues, perhaps even more important to Iraq in the long term, that I hoped he would give me the benefit of his views.

5. Saddam then broke his silence to say that this was a fair question and he would do his best to answer it. He assumed I was not looking for diplomatic courtesies. He was, despite his recent public appointment, a Party man first and foremost and would like to talk as such without beating about the bush. Firstly, then, it was no good trying to separate the Palestine problem from others since by now it coloured the thinking of all Arabs on all subjects. Britain and the West could not wholly escape the burden of history. Yet France, though its past standing in the Arab world could not compare with Britain's, had by a few simple gestures (for that was all that was required) acquired the friendship of the Arab world. He would welcome the restoration of warm and meaningful relations with Britain (and with America too for that matter) which would follow if we could only bring ourselves to show a little greater determination over Palestine. Secondly, we were totally wrong if we believed Iraqi Ba'athists to have any natural affinity with the Soviet bloc. Ba'athism had nothing to do with Communism. He well knew that the long-term aims of the Soviet Union were to communize the world and subject it to Muscovite domination. He was aware of the risks involved in Iraq's present close association with the Soviet bloc, which was forced upon it by the central problem of Palestine. He heartily disliked the presence in Iraq of a Communist Party sponsored by Moscow; Western countries did not nowadays try to promote political parties in Iraq in this way. His Government had repeatedly told the Russians that, whatever its relations with the Eastern bloc, it had no intention of turning its back on the West.

6. But as far as Britain itself was concerned, it was not only over the Palestine issue that the Iraqis hoped for a change of heart or at least a fresh initiative. There was an internal issue, of equal importance to Iraq, where he hoped we would prove more helpful. This was over oil and the IPC. In answer

/to

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to my enquiry, Saddam confirmed that he was well aware of the delegation's current proposals in this field and that the Government was studying them closely. The next part of our conversation was reported fairly fully in paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference; its burden was that he was not yet persuaded that the Company's proposals offered Iraq the most advantageous way of handling their oil affairs or that they definitely represented a concession (tanazul) of substance as well as form. He himself bore no grudge against the IPC and readily admitted that Iraq had profited greatly from its activities; but suspicions were widespread. Many people in Iraq believed that if the British offered you an apple it would prove to be the desert variety (the bitter colocynth). He also said that, the political climate being what it was, if two equally good tenders for a job were put on his desk (one from a British firm and one from, say, Bulgaria), he would opt for the Bulgarian. And he used a number of other metaphors to illustrate the point I assume he was seeking to convey, i.e. that the IPC proposals would have to prove demonstrably better, on close scrutiny, than any possible alternative before the Iraqis would opt for a settlement. I have little doubt that what was in his mind was the risk to which any government in Iraq must now be exposed if it makes a deal with the IPC, namely that the deal would be seized upon by their critics at home and abroad and used as a stick to beat them and unhorse them with. None-the-less, I drew the impression that he was by no means opposed to reaching agreement with the IPC, provided its terms (on the sort of lines now proposed) could be dressed up in such a way that the régime could defend itself against any charges of going back on its word or of yielding to imperialist monopoly pressure. I pointed out that acceptance of the Company's offer would not entail renouncing Soviet bloc participation in oil affairs. There was room for them too, if that was what Iraq wanted.

7. Saddam then reverted to his earlier theme (the train of thought was undisguised) and repeated that Iraq had no intention of throwing in its lot with the Soviet bloc. Well before this stage, I ought to explain, his earlier reserve had quite vanished and he was leaning at me over the corner of his desk talking with great warmth and what certainly seemed sincerity. Amongst other expressions he used the familiar proverbial equivalent (the conversation was in Arabic) of frying-pan and fire; and I urged him to stick to the frying-pan. I then made a few observations on the extent to which Iraq had already put itself in pawn to the Soviet Union, and I quoted their total dependence on the latter in respect of military equipment. "It's not quite as bad as that" was Saddam's rejoinder. By

/now

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now we had long exceeded the half hour officially allotted to me. He walked with me towards the door repeating in earnest terms his hope that Anglo/Iraqi relations would take a real turn for the better, and when I said my final piece (as reported in my telegram) about oil, he stood still for some time nodding his head with that peculiar air of concentration which, it had seemed to me throughout our talk, set him apart from most of his colleagues. Indeed, he struck me as a much more "serious" character than other Ba'athist leaders; and his engaging smile, when he deployed it, seemed part and parcel of his absorption with the subject in hand and not, as with so many of the others, a matter of superficial affability. I should judge him, young as he is, to be a formidable, single-minded and hard-headed member of the Ba'athist hierarchy, but one with whom, if only one could see more of him, it would be possible to do business. It may have been an "act"; but if so, it was a skilful performance for someone with so little experience of the outside world.

8. I enclose a spare copy of this letter in case Oil Department would like one and I am also sending copies to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Tripoli, Kuwait, Tehran, Jedda, Moscow, Washington and the Political Resident, Bahrain.


Yours ever

Glenn

(H.G. Belvoir Paul)

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British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

Agon 29/12
Mr. Hinchcliffe
then ante
P. R. M.

(1/3)

20 December, 1969.

21/12
154

Dear Sir,

Shi'a

Mr. Hinchcliffe (General
and)
three then Pa.
P. R. M.

Jenner wrote to you in July (our previous papers have been destroyed so I have no reference) reporting what appeared to be an attempt by the Ba'ath régime to heal the breach with the Shi'a community. This attempt has been followed by an increasingly noticeable campaign on the part of the Ba'ath leaders to show their friendliness and support for the Shi'a community. The Revolutionary Command Council has announced its decision to lend financial support to the celebration of the forthcoming Najaf Anniversary Celebrations, a decision which has been welcomed by the Ulema of Kerbala.

2. There have been many other small indications of blandishments towards the Shi'a community in the Iraqi press. President Bakr himself has visited Najaf, Saddam Hussein recently visited Kerbala where he donated ID 1,000 to the shrines of Abbas and Hussein and spent more than four hours talking to the Ulema; he is reported as having assured them of the government's special attention to their problems. Much publicity was given to the recent visit by the President together with Hardan Abdul Ghaffar to the mosque at Qadhimain.

3. Unfortunately for the Ba'athis, the efforts of their leaders and the press campaign on their behalf does not seem to have had much effect on the leaders of the Shi'a community. The Iranian Embassy insist that the relations between the Shi'a and the government remain almost as bad as they were when the Ba'athis came to power. The basic cause of the discontent dates from the Ba'ath Government's decision to expel earlier this year Iranian Shi'a who were living here illegally; there is also the more general question of lack of Shi'a representation in the government machine to an extent commensurate with the size of the community. The Iranians point to the failure of the government leaders to obtain any public statement of support from Ayatullah Hakim, leader of the Shi'a community, or any other prominent Shi'a leader. They have maintained that the recent moves towards the Shi'a community have been more in the nature of a public relations campaign but that the Shi'a community in general still awaits any word of encouragement from their own leaders before any hope of breaking down the barrier of distrust is likely to appear.

because
he's paid
by Iran!

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

.../4.

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K - 2 -


4. It is hard to tell whether public festivities attending the coming celebrations at Najaf will make any difference to this attitude of the Shi'a. One cause of dissension, the expulsion of the Iranians mentioned above, is already being cleared up of its own accord. As we have mentioned elsewhere, the Iranians who were expelled (14,000 according to the Iranian Embassy but see below) in the spring and early summer are coming back into the country armed with Iranian passports and valid Iraqi visas. The Iranian Embassy maintains that no difficulties have been placed in the way of their obtaining these visas. The Ambassador was recently told by the Minister of Labour that almost all the 16,000 had now returned and that a special charge had been laid on his Ministry to process their documentation without reference (as is otherwise standard for immigrants) to the security authorities. There still remains however the wider question of the general lack of representation of the Shi'a in the ruling councils of this government, and the extreme dislike of the Shi'a leaders for this government with its anti-religious reputation dating from 1963. Their apparently friendly attitude towards the Shi'a now may merely reflect one more example of the Ba'ath Party's desire to learn from their 1963 mistakes.

Yours ever,

J. H. Symons

(J. H. Symons)

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First Impressions of Iraq

H.M. Ambassador, Baghdad, has written an interesting account of his impressions of Iraq. Less starry eyed than some of his predecessors in the post, he nevertheless feels that we should do what we can to exploit a built in respect displayed by many Iraqis for Britain and for British goods.

2. H.M. Ambassador's recommendation for exploiting our special relationship are in paragraph 10 of the despatch and include:-

- (a) Increased British Council effort in the sphere of English language teaching
- (b) To respond with less "rigidity" (in Whitehall) to Iraqi requests for sophisticated defence equipment and for training of important Iraqi officers
- (c) Provision of a line of credit
- (d) Technical training for Iraqis
- (e) Top level interest in Iraq (the executions to be forgotten)
- (f) Sympathetic understanding for the Arab cause.

3. (a) and (d) we are already encouraging with the inevitable restrictions imposed by the limited budgets of the British Council and O.D.M. (c) This is being looked at by E.C.G.D. (e) is difficult because of our Middle East arms policy and because of security problems posed by the presence of Soviet advisers and technicians with the Iraqi ~~government~~ ^{forces}. On training, we have offered some courses to Iraqi servicemen but courses with a high security classification are more difficult. On (e) it is an unfortunate fact of life that most interest (at both high and low levels) in Iraq is stimulated by such gruesome events as executions. However, we were to consider the possibility of a Ministerial visit to Baghdad as part of Mr. Robert's programme for next year - perhaps we can look at this type of visit again. Finally on (f) our policy in Israel is unlikely to be modified sufficiently to suit the Iraqis and I doubt if trivial ~~questions~~ ^{issues} really do pay big dividends (in the form of a lasting fund of goodwill) in the Arab world.

4. H.M. Ambassador also recommended that we, together with our Western allies, take a joint look at Iraq and coordinate our policies towards the area. As you know, we have looked at this particular problem recently and concluded that unfortunately there is very little scope for coordinated action.

5. We will have to reply to this despatch with a statement of what we are doing to cement, as far

/as

as possible, Anglo/Iraqi relations but first I recommend that this despatch be printed for FCO and Whitehall circulation. I have prepared a copy for the printers. The top copy should be seen by Mr. Tripp, Mr. Arthur and Mr. Hayman who may wish Mr. Luard to see. Sir Denis Greenhill has also shown interest in Anglo/Iraqi relations and may also wish to see the despatch. The ~~two~~ other spare copies should be circulated to E.E. & S.D. (a despatch on Russian involvement in Iraq is to follow) Oil Department, Arabian Department, Defence Policy Department, PUSD and to the Planning Staff.

P.M. Hinchcliffe

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)
17 December, 1969.

CT has got letter my phone
P.M. Hinchcliffe 24/12

1 agree with your comments and recommendations.

2. I have submitted a copy under the normal procedure to Mr. Arthur, Mr. Hayman, Sir D. Greenhill & Mr. Luard.

3. I have also sent a copy to the printers.

4. Mr. Tripp must see a copy o.r (perhaps later under § 2 which will return to us in due course).

5. Please arrange for other departments to see, as you suggest.

6. If our substantive comments will take some time to get off (as is likely) we should send a brief acknowledgement. Could you please draft.

AMH 28
... an

Mr Hinchcliffe

Mr. Alford

AMH

Discussion arranged &

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draft brought Pa.

P.M. Hinchcliffe 30/12

RESTRICTED

156

(NEQ 1/1)

30 December, 1969.

First Impressions of Iraq

In Peter Tripp's absence on leave I am writing to thank you for your despatch 3/1 of 6 December. We found it both interesting and stimulating. We have sent it for printing and have arranged for an immediate distribution to other posts as you requested in your paragraph 12.

2. Copies of the despatch are at present circulating within the Office and it will also have to be seen by the other Whitehall Departments concerned. As soon as we have assembled their comments we will write again at greater length.

(A.A. Asland)

H.E. Mr. G. Balfour-Paul, CMC,
BAGHDAD

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Letter

Type 1 + 

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Secret
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Unclassified

To:—

HE.

G. BALARA - PAUL EY

BAGHDAD

From

AAA

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

NED

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
.....In Confidence

FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF IRAC


Mr Acland

In Pete Trills absence on
leave I am writing to ^{thank} ~~say~~
~~that we found~~ ^{you persisted} 3/1 of
^{an extremely} ~~most~~ ^{interesting} ~~document~~ ^{to stimulating}
6 December. ^{we found it both} ~~interesting~~ ^{document}
sent it for printing and has arranged
for ^{an immediate} ~~the~~ distribution to ^{other} ~~posts~~ as you requested
in your paragraph 12.

2. ^{COPIES OF TYPE} ~~The~~ ^{one} ~~document~~ ^{is} at present circulating
within the office and it will ^{also have to} be seen by ^{the} other
Whitehall departments concerned. As soon
as all ^{relevant} ~~concerned~~ ^{as we have assembled} ~~have~~ ^{their} ~~comments~~ ^{to}
~~comment~~ ^{we will} ~~on views~~ ^{write again} ~~lengthy~~ ^{at} ~~greater length~~ ^{have} ~~at~~ ^{greater length}.

 30
21

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr. Arthur

First Impressions of Iraq

I attach a copy of the minute on the points raised in paragraph 10 of the above despatch, which you asked to see in your minutes of 3 ~~and 7~~ January (below).

(J. P. Tripp)
Near Eastern Department,
21 January, 1970.

Copy to:

Mr. Hayman (*with reference to your minute of 7 January*).

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RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

1 JAN 1957 Mr. Acland

NEQ/H

Reference..... 27/100

First Impressions of Iraq

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/as

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as possible, Anglo/Iraqi relations but first I recommend that this despatch be printed for FCO and Whitehall circulation. I have prepared a copy for the printers. The top copy should be seen by Mr. Tripp, Mr. Arthur and Mr. Hayman who may wish Mr. Luard to see. Sir Denis Greenhill has also shown interest in Anglo/Iraqi relations and may also wish to see the despatch. The ~~two~~ other spare copies should be circulated to E.E. & S.D. (a despatch on Russian involvement in Iraq is to follow) Oil Department, Arabian Department, Defence Policy Department, PUSD and to the Planning Staff.

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)
17 December, 1969.

CT has got letter my done
P.R.M. Hinchcliffe 19/12

1 agree with your comments and recommendations.

2. I have submitted a copy under the normal procedure to Mr. Arthur, Mr. Hayman, Sir D. Greenhill & Mr. Luard.

3. I have also sent a copy to the printers.

4. Mr. Tripp must see a copy o.r (perhaps later under § 2 which will return to us in due course).

5. Please arrange for other departments to see, as you suggest.

6. If our substantive comments will take some time to get off (as is likely) we should send a brief acknowledgement. Could you please draft.

ASH 28
... aii

Mr. Hinchcliffe

Mr. Allard
ASH

discussion arranged &

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draft brought Pa.
P.R.M. Hinchcliffe 30/12

- Born - Syria 1922
- Married - two children
- Education :
 - Baccalaureat First and Second (Lycée officiel Damascus - Syria)
 - B. A. American University of Beirut - Lebanon
 - M. A. American University of Beirut - Lebanon
 - M. S. Cornell University , Ithaca , New York
 - Ph. D. The Graduate Faculty of Political and Social science, New School
New York .

A. International Organizations

- Administrative officer - Department of Trusteeship U.N., 1948 - 50;
- Social Affairs officer - Department of Trusteeship U.N., 1950 - 51.
- Political Affairs officer , TRI, UN , 1951 - 53
- Liaison officer for the Trusteeship Council - Geneva 1950
- Liaison officer - at the Sixth session of the General Assembly , U.N. in Paris 1951-
- Assistant Secretary , the United Nations Visiting Mission to the trust Territories of the Pacific Islands 1953.

B. Government Services

- Lecturer in History - Lycée officiel of Damascus 1945
- Director of external Affairs - the Presidency of the Republic- Damascus 1953- 54
- Lecturer - Syrian University - Faculty of Law 1954 - 55 , 1966 - 1969.
- Director of Occidental Affairs - Second Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs Damascus 1954 - 55.
- Political Advisor , the Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission - Palestine 1953-54
- Second Secretary , Embassy of Syria , Washington D.C. 1955- 56.
- First Secretary , Embassy of Syria , Washington D. C. 1956 - 58,
- Counsellor - Embassy of the United Arab Republic , Washington D.C. 1958-1961
- Minister , Chargé d'Affairs , Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic, Washington D. C. 1961 - 1962.
- Minister Counsellor , Director of American Affairs , Ministry of Foreign Affairs Damascus 1962 - 1964.
- Minister Plenipotentiary , Chargé d'Affairs , Embassy of Syria , London 1964-1966
- Director General of the Department of Eastern and Western European Affairs 1966-1968
- Director general of the Department of International Organizations Treaties and Legal Affairs , Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1968 - present
- Member of the Syrian delegation to the United Nations , the 8th , 9th , 11th, 16th, 17th, and 23rd sessions;
- Representative of Syria to the Permanent Law Commission of the Arab League 1969 present

C. Languages :

- English , French , Arabic.

D. Publications:

- The Christians in Abbasid Period (Thesis)
- Economic possibilities of Syria (Thesis)
- Social Factors Underlying Economic Development of Syria (Thesis)
- Readings in Social Sciences (ed)

NEQ 1/11

LAST PAPER

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NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT

I attach a copy of Baghdad despatch No. 1/3.
.... of 25 August, received in Department 5 September

I have/~~have not~~ sent this despatch for printing
~~FCO/FCO-WH/Volume only, with A/C Commonwealth distribution.~~

A.A. Acland

Assistant

I recommend that it be given priority printing.

do not recommend

I propose to submit the minuted copy

do not propose

unless otherwise instructed.

A.A. Acland

for

Head of Department

Mr. Arthur

Mr. Hayman

Sir Denis Greenhill

R. Hayman

R. Hayman

PUS will see in print.

PR

RUB 12/9

LAST PAPER

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SUMMARY

A year has passed since the Baathists seized power. Their Party programme prescribed energetic measures to secure their continuation in power including the acquisition of control over the armed forces and the administration at all levels, cooperation with certain political groups and the destruction of others. (Paragraphs 1 - 3.)

2. The line adopted on the Arab-Israel question rejected the idea of a political solution and called for the strengthening of relations with the Communist countries. The Baathists would maintain the Arab character of the Gulf. The programme specified steps to be taken to increase revenue from oil and stressed the need for direct exploitation of mineral resources by the State. The programme contained measures affecting banking and the nationalisation of the import trade and of the wholesale trade. (Paragraphs 4 - 6.)

3. The Party has had little success internally. Use of arrests and spy trials to discredit or terrify all potential opposition. Continued sporadic fighting in Kurdistan and alienation of the Shia minority. Abroad, the régime has few friends; good relations with the Communists arises out of Communist support for the Arabs over Palestine. Iraq's relations with her neighbours and fellow Arabs range from the cool and suspicious to the downright hostile. Only in her relations with the British-protected Gulf states has Iraq had some small success. (Paragraphs 7 - 10.)

/4. Although

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4. Although there has been no settlement with the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Baathists' economic policies have fared better. (Paragraph 11.)
5. Although opposition from other groups has been neutralised, rivalries within the Baathist leadership and foreign intrigues make the situation unstable. So long as it survives, future policies will include all measures to ensure their retention of power, the containment of the Kurdish rebellion, an extreme and inflexible line over the Palestine problem, the development of relations with the Communist countries, the extension of their influence in the Gulf, a settlement with the I.P.C. if possible, but, if not, possibly the nationalisation of one of I.P.C.'s constituent companies. The Baathists' ruthlessness may enable them to transfer an increasing proportion of their energies from the struggle to retain power towards carrying out their programme. (Paragraphs 12 - 13.)

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(1/3)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD.

25 August, 1969.

Sir,

In the middle of July 1969 the present rulers of Iraq celebrated the anniversary of three revolutions: that of the 14th of July 1958 which overthrew King Faisal II and the régime of Nuri al Said; that of the 17th of July 1968 which overthrew the régime of Abdul Rahman Arif and that of the 30th of July 1968 when the Baathists ousted those with whom they had collaborated to stage the coup d'état a fortnight earlier. The Baathists used the celebrations to review what they have achieved in their first year of office, which is already longer than their period of power in 1963. The time is therefore opportune for an assessment of what they have done and where they now stand.

2. Those now in power did not achieve it by their own efforts alone. Only President Bakr among those who now occupy leading positions in the Government was prominent between the 17th and the 30th of July 1968. In that brief period the leading light was General Abdul Razzak al Nayif, who had joined with the right-wing Baathists to give his military group the necessary political backing. His downfall came as a result of failure to take precautions against being cast aside by his more skilful fellow-conspirators

/when he had

The Right Honourable
Michael Stewart, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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when he had served his purpose. The first aim of the Baathists was to stay in the saddle. They, therefore, acted quickly to place trusted supporters in key positions in the armed forces, the police and the administration, thus beginning a process, which is still continuing, of strengthening their grip on the whole government apparatus. Unexceptionable declarations of intent were made to reassure the many Iraqis who feared that a new Baathist Government would again plunge the country into violence and bloodshed as in 1963.

3. A clearer idea of Baathist policies emerged, however, after the Seventh Party Congress held in Baghdad in November 1968. Their political aims as then stated were in brief the creation of a national and progressive, or revolutionary, unity within Iraq to face the dangers presented by Imperialism and Zionism and to solve the country's internal problems. For the most important of these, the Kurdish problem, the Party advocated a peaceful solution based on the Bassas proposals, the June Manifesto of 1966. The unpublished Party programme, however, expressed a firm intention to retain all effective power in its hands, to profit from the political support and cooperation of other groups and to destroy those who could or would not be used. Cooperation with the "progressive" Nasserist groups, the definition of relations with President Nasser and limited cooperation with Arab nationalist groups were advocated, as was cooperation with the Communists,

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particularly the Baha Din al Nuri group and Fakhri's pro-Chinese group. Cooperation on the other hand with religious-based movements or Left-Wing Baathists was rejected. In exercising control the Party, it was envisaged, would act through the Regional Command but would not equate itself with the Government. Only a third of the Regional Command would hold Government posts. Further divergences between the Party's publicly announced policies and their actual ones emerged in other fields. For example, the public aims included a laudable reform of the Civil Service and improvement in the armed forces. However, their real intention, as is evident from the unpublished plan, was to place Party members and sympathisers in all sensitive departments and to place the Security Service firmly under Party control. Likewise measures to gain control of the Army included not only the appointment of loyal Party members to the command of sensitive units and the Security and Intelligence Services but also a purge of suspect elements and crash indoctrination courses for officers and NCO's.

4. In international relations the Party programme attached particular importance to the Arab/Israel question, on which the line was uncompromising in that it rejected the idea of a political solution and negotiations leading to peace with Israel. The programme advocated support for guerrilla activity against Israel and called for the unification of the military and political efforts of the Arab States most directly concerned with the Israeli threat. As a consequence of the primary
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importance attached to the Palestine problem, the Party's policy was to include the strengthening of relations with the Communist countries and with all other states which supported the Arab cause. Another facet of this was the doctrine that Iraq's bilateral relations with other countries would depend on the latter's attitude towards the Palestine problem. Elsewhere in the Arab world Party policy was to support the "progressive" Arab régimes and to devote all possible resources to maintaining the Arab character of the Gulf. They would refrain from contact with the Regional Left Wing Baathist régime in Syria and attempt to strengthen the Right Wing Baathist organisation through the National Command.

5. Turning to economic questions, Baathist policy was to bring foreign oil companies under strict control, to strengthen the Iraq National Oil Company, to review previous agreements with the oil companies in order to ensure that Iraq attained its legitimate rights and to see that the future exploitation of the country's mineral resources, and in particular sulphur, should be undertaken by the State. Among the other policy points believed to have been approved but not published officially were a review of the agreement with ERAP, although the Party recognised that the extent to which its terms could be improved was limited by the need to maintain good relations with France. Studies were also to be initiated for the exploitation of the North Rumaila field and for the nationalisation of the Basra Petroleum Company. Great emphasis was put on the "direct exploitation" of oil and mineral resources and

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to this end the Iraq National Oil Company was to be strengthened to accelerate the "direct exploitation" of oil and achieve the eventual nationalisation of I.P.C.

6. Further measures envisaged in the economic sphere were the collective management of industry, unification of the State Budget to include all aspects of the economy, the reform of the tax system and gradual reorganisation of the Banks to increase their specialisation. The existing partial nationalisation of the import trade was to be extended to total nationalisation and plans were to be prepared for the gradual nationalisation of the wholesale trade. On the otherhand facilities were to be offered to attract the investment of Iraq and Arab capital into the private industrial sector. Changes were also contemplated in the field of agrarian reform.

7. An examination of the way in which these policies have been executed shows that the régime's greatest failure is in their handling of internal affairs. Despite efforts they failed to make any headway in gaining the cooperation of other progressive groups. They had little or no success with the NDP, the Party which Kamil Chadirchi founded, or with the Communists although, after imprisoning Aziz al Haj, of the Central "Leadership" of the Communist Party, they obtained some fleeting agreement on cooperation. Baathist control of affairs was exercised not only through the government but also the Central Committee of the Party, and decisions of any importance at all had to be approved not merely by the Council of Ministers or the Revolutionary Command Council, but also

/the relevant

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the relevant Party committee. For some time after the Baathists' seizure of power it seemed that perhaps people's fears were misplaced and that the Baathists had learnt that a repetition of their bloodthirsty behaviour when last in power should be avoided. But there were soon reasons for disquiet. In this city of rumours, stories began to circulate of the arrest and torture not only of members and supporters of the previous government but of others accused of spying, bribery, corruption and economic offences of various kinds. Some of these stories were undoubtedly exaggerated and great circumstantial detail was produced to show how Dr. Kadin Shubbar, who subsequently telephoned his wife, had met three separate deaths. But there was enough truth in some of them to cause real concern. The régime certainly carried out their claim that they had released political prisoners, but it was largely their own supporters who were let out of gaol and the gaols were soon filled with their opponents. Lists were published of people whose property had been attached and who had been arrested on charges of spying for Israel, the United States, the CENTO powers, imperialism or any combination of these. A plot, in which Kuwait may have been implicated, to overthrow the régime was uncovered in December 1968 and this led to the arrest of the Chief of Staff, Major General Faisal al Ansari.

8. The climax of the tension was reached when in January and February a number of accused were hanged and their bodies exhibited in public in Baghdad and Basra. Although these hanged and imprisoned may have in fact been guilty - at least of some offence - the aim was without doubt to fragment,

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discredit or terrify all potential opposition to Baathist rule. But their hopes of winning it support of certain political groupings such as the National Democratic Party and some of the Communist groups had come to nothing, probably because their intention to dominate any alliance was only too apparent. In the early summer of 1969 there were fresh waves of arrests and some of those arrested earlier were interviewed on the television, by Mohammad Said al Sahhaf, an urbane and rather sinister Arab version of Robin Day, to whom they made "confessions" of spying for the CIA. Those who appeared included the former Military Governor of Baghdad, Rashid Muslih, and it was officially suggested that Abdul Rahman Bazzaz, who was arrested at the end of 1968 would also be subjected to a similar ordeal. The régime also failed to overcome Mulla Mustafa Barazani's deep mistrust, and, in spite of the Government's professed wish for a peaceful solution, sporadic fighting continued between the Mulla's Kurds and the Government's armed forces, which also gave backing to the Kurdish group hostile to Barazani led by Talabani. Furthermore, through another piece of clumsiness, the régime subsequently alienated the important Shia element, who were already somewhat restive following the deterioration of relations with Iran over the Shatt al Arab dispute.

9. The Baathists have been no more successful in the conduct of their relations with other Arab countries and the rest of the world. Admittedly their early rejection of a political solution to the Palestine problem has perhaps gained support in the Arab

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world as a result of continued lack of progress towards a settlement, but the Arabs are no nearer to a military solution now than they were before. The Iraqis have given overt support to the Commando movement and initially favoured Al Fatah. Subsequently they decided that Al Fatah was gaining too much popularity and they founded their own Commando organisation, the Arab Liberation Front, which latterly appears to have been used more for their aims in Syria than against the Israelis. Attempts were made in Syria to change the complexion of the government there and the agreement of General Hafiz al Assad was obtained for the stationing of Iraqi troops in that country. However, Iraqi hopes of Hafiz al Assad's Right Wing gaining control were dashed by the results of the Syrian Baath Party Congress. A Sudanese delegation visited Baghdad shortly after the Ngy revolution in Khartoum and there has been a growing resemblance between the policies of the Iraqi and the new Sudanese régimes. Contacts have also been made with the People's Republic of Southern Yemen. However, Iraq is at present no closer to the "progressive" Arab regimes in the U.A.R. and Syria, and seems to have comparatively few friends.

10. It is the willingness of the Soviet Union and of other Communist countries to support the Arab case which has won them favour with Iraq and has led to Iraq's approval of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the grant of diplomatic recognition to East Germany. A number of important loan, Technical Assistance and cultural agreements have in the last few months been signed with the U.S.S.R., the G.D.R. and other /Bloc countries,

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Bloc countries, and all this tended to increase Iraq's dependence on the Bloc. Even among the East Europeans, however, Iraq managed to pick a quarrel over Rumania's relations with Israel. Closer to home, relations with all her neighbours, with the possible exception of Turkey, and fellow Arabs range from the cool and suspicious to the down-right hostile, though Iraq should not bear all the blame for her difficulties with Iran. Only in her relations with the British-protected states of the Persian Gulf does Iraq appear to have had a small measure of success, and the exchange of visits between the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Deputy Prime Minister General Haidan al Tikriti appears at least on the surface to have been cordial. Moreover, the Iraqis have been increasingly active in the economic sphere in Bahrain and Abu Dhabi.

11. The Baathists have done better in some of the economic aspects of their Party programme. Although they have not been able to persuade the Iraq Petroleum Company that it is worthwhile trying to settle their dispute on the sort of terms the Government would offer, at least income from oil production has risen and they have obtained some satisfaction from the conclusion of the Basra Port Dues Agreement. They have, moreover, taken their plans for the direct exploitation of North Rumaila oil further by concluding an agreement with the U.S.S.R. but otherwise have not pursued an extreme oil policy. They have also made an agreement with Poland for the direct exploitation of the sulphur deposits at Mishraq. A sensible Ministry of Planning has been established under a competent Minister who is making genuine

/efforts to

efforts to improve the country's planning mechanism. Further measures have been taken over agrarian reform; peasants have been relieved from paying sums due on their original allocations of land and landlords' rights have been curtailed still further. The economy is in fair shape and the government have been taking positive measures to improve their export performance, notably by entering into barter arrangements with supplier countries. Fears that the nationalisation of imports would be announced during the July celebrations proved to be unfounded and the Private Sector still continues to enjoy approximately the same share of the market as it did previously. Preference has, however, increasingly been given to State Trading organisations in the field of imports. The import licence allocations of the larger merchants have been reduced in accordance with the Bathist philosophy that petite bourgeoisie is respectable while grande bourgeoisie is not.

12. A feature of the political scene since July 1968 has been the constant flow of conjecture, much of it certainly well based, about internal rivalries within the leadership of the régime. It is probable that in whatever else they may have failed, the régime have succeeded far the time being in emasculating or neutralising all other centres of potential opposition. The most obvious threat to the continuation of their government lies in the rivalries within their own leadership. Even this threat, however, may not be as great as might at first appear, because while each individual or faction is suspiciously watching the moves of his colleagues there is less chance of one or other

/gaining

gaining the advantage of surprise. Nevertheless, the situation is unstable and is made more so by the moves which are widely believed to be being made by at least two of Iraq's neighbours to bring about a government with which they could live more easily. So long as it survives however certain lines of future policy can be discerned with fair precision from the Party's programme and from the lines the régime have followed in the past year. In internal affairs, their overriding aim will be the retention of power, and to this end they will seek allies wherever they can find them eliminating those with whom they cannot work. They are at present again attempting to form a "Progressive National Front". They can probably see no way out of the Kurdish impasse and will continue with their efforts on a limited scale to contain Barazani's rebellion.

Internationally, they will take the lead in advocating an extreme and inflexible policy towards Israel but, in spite of their aspirations to lead the Arabs, will not succeed to any greater extent than they have already in creating the unity without which such a policy is useless; and they will develop their relations with the Communist countries because it is from there alone that they can expect support, even though this is qualified. They will try to extend their influence in the Gulf on both state and Party levels. On the economic front, they appear still to hope for a settlement with the Iraq Petroleum Company which would bring in money they badly need in the near future and a continuing higher level of income. This would have the advantage of enabling them to maintain their balancing act

/between East

between East and West more convincingly. Some influential members of the régime do not even regard the door closed on some arrangement with I.P.C. over North Rumaila. But the possibility that they will make some move to nationalise at least one of the constituent companies, as envisaged in the Party's programme, cannot be excluded should a settlement not be reached before long.

13. What all this amounts to is perhaps not very different from what the world has come to expect from Iraqi Governments. The difference lies however in the nature of the Baathists: they are uncompromising and determined, even ruthless, they have a Party organisation which covers the country, and they have a programme. They will not be overthrown easily and despite the efforts of their many enemies they may yet succeed in transferring an increasing proportion of their energies from the struggle to retain power towards carrying out their programme.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Kuwait, Tehran and Jedda and to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

Cutting dated -1 JAN 1970 19

More Marxist flavour for Iraq Cabinet

BY RICHARD JOHNS, MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT

THE IRAQI Cabinet reshuffle announced yesterday in Baghdad appears to give the Government a more Marxist hue.

Mr. Aziz Sharif, the new Minister of Justice, was leader of the Shaab Party, the Communist front organisation which was allowed to exist before the overthrow of the monarchy at a time when the party itself was banned. Dr Suad Khalil Ismail, Minister of Higher Education, is also known for his Marxist leanings.

For some time now there have been rumours that Communists were to be allowed some kind of participation in the Cabinet, if not in the Revolutionary Command Council, the Baath Party's ruling body in Iraq.

The second interesting feature of the new appointments is the elevation of Dr. Saadoun Hamadi, chairman of National Iraqi Oil Company, to be Minister of Oil and Minerals as well. This will integrate petroleum affairs more fully in the political domain following the creation this autumn of a steering committee dealing

with the subject within the Revolutionary Command Council.

It is possible that Dr. Hamadi will eventually hand over the chairmanship of INOC. However, he is an altogether stronger figure than his predecessor, Dr. Rahid al Rifai who becomes a Minister of State without any apparent special duties.

The appointment of Mr. Izzat Ibrahim al Douri as Minister of Agrarian Reform may indicate that President al Bakr may now be determined to implement more determinedly the programme in this field about which the regime has promised.

Another significant development recently has been the abolition of the posts of Vice-Premier—held by the two rival hard men of the regime, Lieut-Gen. Salah Mahdi Ammash, Minister of the Interior, and Air Marshal Hardan Takriti, Minister of Defence. This is understood to have followed the recent expansion of the Revolutionary Command Council and seems to have been motivated by President Bakr's desire to keep rivals at a distance.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-1 JAN 1970

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THE TIMES

Cutting dated 19 DEC 1969, 19

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 30 DEC 1969

**Iraq frees more
ex-Ministers**

Baghdad, Dec. 18.—The Iraq Government has released another group of political prisoners including Mr. Tahir Yahia, a former Prime Minister, informed sources said here today. Two other Ministers in the ousted Aref regime, Malik Duhan al-Hassan and Hassan Tamir, were also freed.

The releases are seen as part of the Baathist party's new policy of setting up a national front.—Agence France Presse.

Mr. Hinchcliffe

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SUNDAY TIMES

Cutting dated 21 DEC 1969

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 30 DEC 1969

4

The black stain on Iraq-by a friend

By Nicholas Carroll
Diplomatic Correspondent

A FORMER economic adviser and close friend of President El-Bakr of Iraq has written him a long, reproachful letter about what he calls the "avalanche of false accusations and lies and the painful and pathetic theatricals that have planted a black stain on the modern history of Iraq."

A copy of this remarkable document, about 10,000 words long, has reached the Sunday Times. Copies of it were sent by the writer, Mr Lufti al-Obeidie, a well known and wealthy Iraqi lawyer and businessman, to 50 people in Iraq as well as to several Egyptian Ministers and the Prime Ministers of Libya, Kuwait and Jordan.

Mr Obeidie's association with President El-Bakr began in 1962. Between 1963, when El-Bakr became Prime Minister for a short time following the overthrow of the Kassem regime, and the coup of July 1968 which brought El-Bakr to the Presidency, Mr Obeidie claims he used to see him three or four times a week whenever he was in Baghdad. Two days after the July 1968 coup he left Iraq and now lives in Western Europe where he is at pains to keep his whereabouts secret.

Mr Obeidie never held any political appointment in Iraq, though he was invited to do so more than once.

Nevertheless he claims in his letter to have found jobs for El-Bakr's friends in his various businesses. He was sent abroad on an economic mission in 1963 and was nominated for membership of an Advisory Council.

The letter stresses the close relationship El-Bakr had with members of the Government who have since been put in prison and tortured.

During trials earlier this year the Iraqi Government accused Mr Obeidie of acting as a spy and agent. In his letter Mr Obeidie retorts by writing of

"the deep and brotherly relationship which bound us together all those years, while you were occupying a very sensitive leading role, whether in power or away from it."

He adds: "I cannot possibly imagine that you would maintain and enjoy such close friendship with a person you suspected of working as an agent and spy. I could not imagine you would admit having been fooled all these years. You always used to declare that the only person who maintained his love for you was me."

Much of Mr Obeidie's letter is devoted to recalling details of President El-Bakr's intimate and loyal relations with leading personalities formerly in the Government who have been imprisoned and tortured under the present regime. Mr Obeidie also sets out in detail the record of his business transactions to refute accusations made against him in confessions extorted from former associates.

The chief interest in the letter is that it shows that the opponents of the present Iraqi regime are better organised and more sophisticated than their predecessors in public relations techniques.

It is hard to predict the impact of the letter on the rulers of this traditionally cruellest of Arab countries, where political failure has for centuries frequently brought mutilation, torture and prolonged imprisonment. But it may raise faint hopes of less barbarous behaviour.

Mr Hinchcliffe

Ra
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Cutting dated 31 DEC 1969 19

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
31 DEC 1969

13 sentenced to death in Iraq 3

BAGDAD, Tuesday.

THE Iraqi Revolutionary Tribunal has sentenced 13 people, including a woman, to death in absentia on charges of spying.

The official Iraq News Agency, which reported the sentences, did not say when they were pronounced.

But it said the court called on the convicted people to appear before the tribunal within six months. Otherwise the sentences against them would be considered final.

EXECUTIONS

The agency said the woman—Hoda Selim Al-Khayyat—was an English language teacher at a Bagdad secondary school. She is the first Iraqi woman to be convicted of spying.

The convicted men include her husband, Ibrahim Razzouki. The names indicated that three of the sentenced people were Christians and the rest Moslems.

Fifty-four men have been executed in Iraq this year after being convicted by the Revolutionary Tribunal of spying for Israel and the United States and Iranian Intelligence.—Reuter.

Mr. Huchelbe

Ru.

Iraq Internal

Rum

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Reports On Ba'athist Policy; Iraqi Constitution; List Of Iraqi Cabinet Members; 'The Arab World And Israel'; Execution Of Spies. Reports On The Internal Political Situation In Iraq. 25 Aug. 1969. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/871. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107474111/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=4b0f1e77&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.